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It is difficult to determine from the face of a negotiable in-
strument bearing two or more signatures whether one party
signatory intends to bind the other signatories, himself as co-
maker, or himself alone. The question is reduced to the relation
and form of the signatures, and the objective intent of the agent
as disclosed by the bare instrument controls.' When a negotiable
instrument is signed by an individual directly beneath the name
of a corporation, without indicating by words of agency that he
is signing merely in a representative capacity, he is prima facie
personally liable, unless it can be established as between the im-
mediate parties that he intended not to be individually bound.
Adopting this position section 3-403 (2) (b) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code provides:
An authorized representative who signs his own name to an
instrument ... except as otherwise established between
the immediate parties, is personally obligated if the instru-
ment names the person represented but does not have that
the representative signed in a representative capacity .... 2
Under section 3-403(2) (b) if an authorized agent discloses
the name of his principal, but fails to disclose his representative
capacity, he may escape personal liability in litigation between
the parties to the original transaction by showing by parol evi-
dence that he signed in a representative capacity. After the in-
strument has passed from the payee into the hands of a third
party holder in due course the apparent statutory language pro-
hibits the use of parol evidence to show representative capacity.
In Pollin v. Mindy Maaufaotuwing Co.,3 however, the Superior
* Pollin v. Mindy Mfg. Co., 236 A2d 542 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967).
1. W. BnrrTokq, BILLS AND NoTas § 174 (2d ed. 1961).
2. UmIoRm Cou uncL CODE § 3-403(2) (b).
3. 236 A.2d 542 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1967). Judgment below had been rendered
against the corporation, but on appeal this was mentioned only in passing in
an attempt to further solidify the Court's reasoning in holding the agent-
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Court of Pennsylvania denied recovery by a third party
endorsee against one who affixed his signature to a payroll check
directly beneath the corporate name without indicating his
representative capacity.
In Pol/n the checks were boldly imprinted at the top with the
corporate name, address, and appropriate payroll check number.
The typed name of the drawee bank appeared in the lower left
hand corner of the instrument, and the corporate name was im-
printed in the lower right hand corner. Directly beneath the
corporate name were two blank lines. The defendant-appellant
had signed the top line without any designation of office or
capacity. Pointing out that the Code imposes liability on the
individual only when the instrument controverts any showing of
representative capacity, the court considered the instrument in
its entirety. The court held that disclosure on the face of the
instrument that the checks were payable from a special payroll
account of the corporation over which appellant had no control
as an individual negated any contention that appellant intended
to make the instrument his own order to pay money to the payee.
The interpretation placed upon section 3-403(2) (b) by the
Pennsylvania court appears to differ from the sound policy
intended by the Code framers-that the transferability of nego-
tiable instruments should not be impeded. To understand this
overriding policy consideration a review of case decisions ren-
dered prior to the adoption of the Uniform Commercial Code
must be undertaken.
The law merchant, absorbed as a body of rules and principles
by the common law,4 exerted force in the determination of the
rights and obligations of parties to commercial instruments.
Commercial instruments existed only as a result of mercantile
enterprise, and became negotiable by the custom of merchants. 5
As the body of commercial case law increased, the authorities
became increasingly aware of the hopeless confusion concerning
the signature of an authorized representative. 6
4. Aigler, Recognition of New Types of Negotiable Instruments, 24
COLUm. L. REv. 563, 564 (1924).
5. See Peay v. Pickett, 1 Nott & McC. 254, 255 (S.C. 1818).
6. 1 J. Joycs & H. JoycE, DEFENSEs To CommrERCAL PAPR § 31 (2d ed.
1924); See Commercial Nat'1 Bank v. Reichelt, 62 Mont. 303, 204 P. 1037,
1038 (1922). See generally F. BEUTEL, BEuTEz's BRANNAN NEGoTiArLE Ix-
STRUMENTS LAw 48 (7th ed. 1948).
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The Negotiable Instruments Law (N.I.L.) 57 promulgated in
1896, was intended to create uniformity in the rights and liabil-
ties of parties to negotiable instruments throughout the nation.8
Prior to the N.I.L. if a person indicated representative capacity
by adding the words "Agent, President, Secretary, etc.," the
majority opinion was that the additional words were merely
desoriptio personaeg9 and that parol evidence was not admissible
to establish representative capacity. Under the N.I.L. formula-
tion, however, if one signed an instrument and affixed words
indicating representative capacity, the disclosed principal, rather
than the agent, would be individually bound.
Under section 20 of the N.I.L.10 two signatory procedures
would have effectively disclosed the agent's intention to bind the
principal: (1) A recital on the face of the instrument that the
agent signed for or on behalf of the principal, or in a represen-
tative capacity; or (2) the addition to his signature of words
indicating the same." When there was disclosure of the princi-
pal and two agents signatory, however, and only one of the
agents indicated representative capacity, there was a division of
authority with respect to whether the second agent was person-
ally liable or could show by parol evidence that he intended not
to be bound.
In CoaZ River Collieries v. Eureka Coal & Wood Co.,12
the defendant, president of Eureka Coal, affixed his name with-
7. F. BEUTEL, BEmUT'S BRANNAN NEGOTIABIX INSTRUMENTs LAW 79
(7th ed. 1948).
8. Coal River Collieries v. Eureka Coal & Wood Co., 144 Va. 263, 279,
132 S.E. 337, 342 (1926); cf. Austin, Nichols & Co. v. Gross, 98 Conn. 782,
120 A. 596, 597 (1923).
9. 1 J. JoYcE & H. JOYCE, D ENSES TO CoMMEacIAL PAa § 31 (2d ed.
1924); Metcalf v. Williams, 104 U.S. 93 (1881); Barclay v. Parsley, 110 Pa.
13, 20 A. 411 (1885); Wallace v. Langston, 52 S.C. 133, 29 S.E. 552 (1898).
But see Mechanics' Bank v. Bank of Columbia, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 100
(1820). In this case a cashier drew a check and signed it without any official
esignation. The bank's name appeared on the face of the instrument The
Court resorted to parol evidence stating that if marks of an official character
not only exist on the face of the instrument, but p redominate, parol evidence
is necessary to fix its true character.
10. See F. BEui"EL, BEuTEs's BRANNAN NEGOTIABLE INsTRUMENTS LAW
411 (7th ed. 1948). Section 20 of the N.I.L. provides:
Where the instrument contains or a person adds to his signature words
indicating that he signs for or on behalf of a principal, or in a represen-
tative capacity, he is not liable on the instrument if he was duly author-
ized; but the mere addition of words describing him as an agent, or as
filling a representative character, without disclosing his principal, does
not exempt him from personal liability.
11. W. BRiTroN, BILLS AND NoTEs § 163 (2d ed. 1961).
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out designating his official capacity. The corporate name and
the signature of the company's treasurer, denoting a representa-
tive capacity, appeared directly above the defendant's signature.
Defendant attempted to use parol evidence to show that the
payee had notice of his official character, and had understood
that the defendant was not to be bound individually. Ruling that
parol evidence was inadmissible and that the unqualified signa-
ture of the defendant rendered him personally liable, the court
stated that the "unexpressed intention could not be permitted to
vary the legal effect of the express contract evidenced by an
individual signature."' s
Similar decisions interpreted the language of section 20 to
indicate clearly a purpose to exclude parol evidence. These courts
reasoned that the N.I.L. itself fixed the legal effect of the instru-
ment and an indorsement appearing thereon. 14 Therefore, the
intent of the parties, as legally evidenced on the face of the in-
strument, determined who was bound by the terms of the
contract.15
A substantial number of courts developed a different line of
reasoning than that evidenced by the decision in CoaZ River
Collieries. In these cases indications of apparent ambiguities on
the face of an instrument occasioned by the signature of two
agents beneath the corporate nane, one indicating representative
capacity and the other being silent, permitted the admission of
parol evidence to controvert personal liability. In TWright V.
Drury Petroleum Cor.16 two agents signed a note, disclosing
their corporate principal. One agent indicated official capacity
by inclusion of the words "Executive Board" next to his signa-
ture. The second agent had no representative capacity evidenced
on the face of the note. The court admitted parol evidence to
establish representative capacity. The court gave a liberal inter-
pretation to section 20 in order to permit the admission of parol
evidence. It interpreted the statutory requirement of words in-
13. Id. at 282, 132 S.E. at 343.
14. Betz v. Bank of Miami Beach, 95 So. 2d 891 (Fla. 1957) ; Valentine v.
Hayes, 102 Fla. 157, 135 So. 538 (1931); Wright v. Drury Petroleum Corp.,
229 Mich. 542, 201 N.W. 484 (1924); Coal River Collieries v. Eureka Coal
& Wood Co., 144 Va. 263, 132 S.E. 337 (1926).
15. Wallace v. Langston, 52 S.C. 133, 29 S.E. 552 (1898) ; see Coal River
Collieries v. Eureka Coal & Wood Co., 144 Va. 263, 132 S.E. 337 (1926);
Farmers' State Bank v. Lamon, 132 Wash. 369, 231 P. 952 (1925); W.
BunoN, BMLS AND NoTs § 174 (2d ed. 1961). Contra, Fricke v. Belz, 237
Mo. App. 861, 177 S.W.2d 702 (1944).
16. 229 Mich. 542, 201 N.W. 484 (1924).
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dicating representative capacity to require no more than the use
of appropriate words pointing to such capacity;17 and that the
relative position of such words and signature was immaterial.
A majority of the courts allowing parol evidence to show rep-
resentative capacity, has limited its use to litigation between the
original parties to the instrument. Consequently, when there
was a patent ambiguity with respect to whether an agent signed
in a representative or an individual capacity, parol evidence was
admissible to show the facts and circumstances attending the
execution of the instrument.' 8
In New Georgia National Bank v. J. & G. Lippmann 19 the
New York court, speaking through Judge Cardozo, formulated
a more liberal standard for permitting the admission of parol
evidence. It provides:
Whenever the form of the paper is such as fairly to indicate
to the eye of common sense that the maker signs as agent or
in a representative capacity, he is relieved of personal lia-
bility if duly authorized.20
Under the Lippmann formulation if one agent indicated offi-
cial capacity and a second agent failed to do so, disclosure of
the principal together with the relation and form of the agents'
signatures would place an ordinary man on notice that the sec-
ond agent also signed in a representative capacity. Therefore,
if the agency was established, the agent could not be individually
bound.
Another liberalization of the rules regarding the admissibility
of parol evidence concerned its admissibility against a holder in
due course. When parol evidence was sought to establish an
understanding, recognized by the original parties to the trans-
action, that the agent was not to be personally liable it was
held inadmissible as against the holder in due course. In con-
trast, when the instrument was so ambiguous as to put a reason-
ably prudent person on inquiry with respect to which party was
17. Id., 201 N.W. at 485.
18. Myers v. Chesley, 190 Mo. App. 371, 177 S.W. 326 (1915); see, e.g.,
Norman v. Beling, 33 N.J. 237, 163 A.2d 129 (1960); cf. Lazarov v. Klyce,
195 Tenn. 27, 255 S.W.2d 11 (1953).
19. 249 N.Y. 307, 164 N.E. 108 (1928).
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to be personally liable, parol evidence would be admissible as
against an endorsee.21
In Germania National Bank iv. Mariner2 2 the note was similar
in fashion to the note in Drury Petroleum Corp. The in-
strument contained words stating that the corporation would
pay. The plaintiff bank purchased the note from the payee, un-
aware of the capacity in which the defendant had signed. The
court stated that when a written contract is ambiguous in its
terms, parol evidence may be introduced to show facts and cir-
cumstances surrounding execution to aid in construction.23 The
manner in which the defendant had signed the note, in conjunc-
tion with the statement on the face of the instrument that the
corporation promised to pay, convinced the court to admit parol
evidence to explain the note's ambiguity. Holding that the de-
fendant placed his signature on the note not intending to be
personally liable, the court stated:
This rule [parol evidence] applies to commercial paper, even
in the hands of third persons, because, where the ambiguity
is apparent to a reasonably prudent man on the face of the
paper, he is necessarily put upon inquiry.
24
Commenting on the Germania decision, the court in Coal River
Collieries ruled that only when an ambiguity was created on the
face of the instrument, or when there was uncertainty as to the
liability of the agent would parol evidence be properly admis-
sible. Even then the use of parol evidence would be confined to
litigation between the immediate parties.
25
21. Norman v. Beling, 33 N.J. 237, 163 A2d 129 (1960); Germania Nat'l
Bank v. Mariner, 129 Wis. 544, 109 N.W. 574 (1906); W. BRiTroN, Bnis
AN) NoTEs § 164 (2d ed. 1961). Contra, Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank &
Trust Co. v. Hendrix Mill & Lumber Co., 186 S.C. 268, 195 S.E. 562 (1938).
In this case the court stated that to defeat a bona fide purchaser for value,
more than proof of facts and circumstances which give rise to suspicion or
put a prudent person on inquiry is necessary. Actual notice or knowledge of
this defect, indicating a purchase in bad faith, would be deemed sufficient.
22. 129 Wis. 544, 109 N.W. 574 (1906).
23. Id., 109 N.W. at 576.
24. Id.
25. Coal River Collieries v. Eureka Coal & Wood Co., 144 Va. 263, 132




Under the Gernwitz formulation parol evidence would be admissible because
the note evidences an ambiguity with respect to the capacity in which B signed.
But under the Coal River Collieries formulation A's signature denoting rep-
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Much of the difference of judicial opinion can be further un-
derstood by examining the different promissory terms used in
the instruments. If the note contained the words "we promise"
the logical inference was that the agent, in the absence of words
qualifying his representative capacity, intended to be bound as
a co-maker. The transferability of negotiable instruments would
be hindered if a third party to the transaction were charged
with notice. This notice would require a duty of inquiry26 into
the subjective intent of the party signatories.
It is of vastly more importance to the commerce of the coun-
try that the integrity and unassailability of negotiable
paper, in the hands of bona fide holders for value, shall be
maintained by the courts, than that persons who carelessly
put their names to such paper shall be relieved of liability
thereon.
27
If the promissory terms were "I promise" or the "corporation
promises," there would be justification for the belief that the
agent signed merely as a matter of course and did not assume
individual liability. The appearance of the corporate name on
the face of the paper would justify the belief that the trans-
action was intended to create a corporate rather than an indivi-
dual obligation.28 This would explain the use of parol evidence
as between immediate parties. As to a third party to the trans-
action, however, unless the note was taken in bad faith, the ad-
mission of parol evidence would again impair the negotiability
of instruments.
While a corporation may adopt a typed or printed signature
on a note, corporate by-laws frequently require the signature
of corporate officers.29 Because a corporation must act through
resentative capacity taken in conjunction with B's signature that does not indi-
cate representative capacity, clearly shows that B, on the face of the instru-
ment, intended to be personally bound. Because there are no words to the con-
trary (negating personal liability) there cannot be shown by parol evidence
an intention contrary to that which the face of the note unambiguously reveals.
26. 2 J. JoYcE & H. JoYcE, DmrqsEs TO CommERCiAL PAPER § 695 (2d ed.
1924).
27. Continental Illinois Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. v. Hendrix Mill & Lumber
Co., 186 S.C. 268, 271, 195 S.E. 562, 563 (1938).
28. Mechanics' Bank v. Bank of Columbia, 18 U.S. (5 Wheat.) 100 (1820);
Fricke v. Belz, 237 Mo. App. 861, 177 S.W.2d 702 (1944).
29. 1 W. DAvENPORT & R. HENsON, ILLINOIs PRAcrnc 222 (1967). See also
2 J. JoYcE & H. JovcE, DmNsEs To COMMERcIAL PAPER § 704 (2d ed.
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its agents, it is common to expect that the corporate name when
stamped or typed on the negotiable instrument will be accom-
panied by the signatures of persons who would be authorized to
sign the instrument. In Norman v. Beling8° an action was
brought by the holder of a series of notes against one of the
individual signers. The notes contained the corporate maker's
typed name. Beneath the typed name appeared the signatures
of two individuals, neither of which designated representative or
corporate capacity. The New Jersey court held that the notes,
evidenced by the terms "we promise to pay," were ambiguous
on their face, and permitted the admission of parol evidence to
show representative capacity. The court stated that a reasonably
prudent man would be unable to determine with any degree of
certainty whether the defendant signed as co-maker or as an
agent acting only for the corporation.81
In Norman the court indicated that the words "we promise"
resulted in a decision no different than had the note indicated
the "company promises to pay. 3 2 In Reeve v. First NationaZ
Bank3 the court stated that "the word 'we' is often used as a
corporation aggregate,"3 4 thereby creating the same effect as if
the corporation itself made the promise. The court in Norman,
commenting on the decision in Germania, stated that when the
face of the instrument is ambiguous and suggests a defect, "the
purchaser holder in due course is put on inquiry because to
permit the purchaser to ignore such a warning with impunity
has no sound basis."3 5
The decisions rendered in Germania and Norman added an-
other dimension to the admissibility of parol evidence at the
expense of a bona fide purchaser for value. Circumventing the
established principle that prior equities and defenses when per-
sonal to the individual do not defeat the rights of a subsequent
holder in due course, an unfavorable result was reached with
respect to the transferability of negotiable instruments. The
result was that the endorsee, a purchaser for value, was con-
sidered as having taken the instrument subject to the apparent
ambiguity and therefore in bad faith.
30. 33 NJ. 237, 163 A.2d 129 (1960).
31. Id., 163 A2d at 132.
32. Id., 163 A2d at 133.
33. 54 N.J.L. 208, 23 A. 853 (1892).
34. Id. at 211, 23 A. at 854.
35. Norman v. Beling, 33 N.J. 237, 163 A2d 129, 133 (1960).
1968]
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The term negotiable instrument is merely a name given to par-
ticular documents that possess certain qualities or attributes.
Freedom from the defenses and equities of prior parties when in
the hands of an innocent purchaser for value is one of its prin-
ciple features.3 6 Whereas the N.I.L. was deficient in ascer-
taining liability of multiple signatories to a negotiable instru-
ment,3 7 section 3-403(2) (b) of the Uniform Commercial Code
clarifies the N.I.L. and eliminates the confusion accompanying
the awkward forms of signatures by representatives.
When the agent discloses his principal but fails to indicate his
representative capacity, and the immediate parties are aware of
the agent's capacity and intent, the Code permits the showing
of representative capacity as between the immediate parties. In
contrast CoaZ River Collieres8s denied the use of parol evidence,
on the ground that the instrument was a fully integrated con-
tract. To permit a contrary showing by parol evidence would
have altered or modified the terms of the contract. The Code,
however, by adopting the rule of Megowan v. Peterson,9 permits
parol evidence to be introduced to prove representative capacity
in litigation between the payee and the individual signer. Parol
evidence does not vary the specific terms of the contract, but
shows the nature and purpose of the transaction."
In PoZlin v. Mindy Manufacturing Co. 41 an initial inquiry
with respect to whether the instrument indicated the capacity
in which the appellant signed failed to reveal a representative
capacity. Instead of giving effect to the aggregate words and
intent of the section, the Pennsylvania court fragmented the
section and gave emphasis to the words "if the instrument . . .
does not show that the representative signed in a representative
36. Sutherland, Article 3-Logic, Experience and Negotiable Paper, 1952
Wis. L. REv. 230.
37. See W. HAWKLAND, COMMERCAL PAPER 30 (1st ed. 1959).
38. 144 Va. 263, 132 S.E. 337 (1926).
39. 173 N.Y. 1, 65 N.E. 738 (1902). An action was brought to recover
from defendant the amount of a promissory note containing the words "I
promise to pay" and evidenced by the signature, "Charles G. Peterson, Trus-
tee." Plaintiff contended that defendant's representative capacity must be
disclosed upon the face of the instrument. The court held that insofar as inno-
cent purchasers for value are concerned the representative capacity must be
disclosed on the face of the note, but insofar as a payee was concerned there was
no such requirement if it was the intent of the agent to bind only his
principal.
40. W. HAWKLAND, CommERcrAL PAPER 31 (1st ed. 1959).
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capacity." 42 The court, by considering only a part of section
3-403 (2) (b), then construed the instrument in its entirety. By
doing this the court successfully sidestepped the issue of parol
evidence, frustrating the full import of the section. That section
declares that when the agent fails to disclose his principal de-
spite the use of words indicating a representative capacity, or
when he discloses his principal but fails to designate a represen-
tative capacity, unless it can be shown that there was an under-
standing as between the immediate parties that the agent was not
liable, the agent is personally liable. By limiting the section to
the immediate parties, in all events a third party transferee
would be protected even if an agreement did exist as between the
immediate parties.
The court in Pollin reasoned that the agent signed in a repre-
sentative because the instrument was a payroll check, payable out
of a fund over which the appellant as an individual had no con-
trol. The court, however, erred in permitting the agent to prevail
over an endorsee who had purchased the instrument in a good
faith transaction with the payee.
The court appeared to reason subjectively that the endorsee
took the instrument with notice because the character of the in-
strument sufficiently disclosed that the appellant could have
signed only in a representative capacity. A more logical ap-
proach to the identical result would have been to construe the
instrument in relation to the rights and obligations of the parties
in the course of negotiating the check. The court could have
examined only the position of the parties and the rights the
endorsee took from his transferor, the payee. Section 3-302(1)
defines a holder in due course and requires a taking for value, in
good faith and without notice of any defense.43 The court could
have examined the endorsee's position as a bona fide purchaser
for value without notice of any defense good as against himself
or his immediate transferor. In PolZin if the endorsee took with
notice that the instrument created an ambiguity as to the party
to pay,44 thereby barring any claim as a holder in due course, the
court could have absolved the agent of liability because the
endorsee took the instrument subject to all defenses which would
42. Id. at 545.
43. UxTom C0mcIiAL CODE § 3-302(1).
44. U nOR Com ,m LcA. CODE § 3-304(1) (a).
1968]
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have been available to the agent on a simple contract action.45
As indicated by the reported facts, however, the endorsee was a
a bona fide purchaser for value as against the agent, unless a
payroll check was sufficient notice to prevent the endorsee from
claiming as such. However tenuous the offered suggestion may
be, it is clear that the court gave no consideration to this line
of thought.
The court, however, should have based its decision on a proper
interpretation of the applicable Code section. The signature by
an authorized representative was the direct issue. By a proper
application of section 3-403(2) (b) the court would have been
limited to a finding of whether the agent signed in a represen-
tative capacity. If the action had involved the original parties
to the transaction the court would have been within the statutory
language by admitting parol evidence. When the action is be-
tween an agent and a third party endorsee, however, no consid-
eration need be given to extrinsic evidence. The court should
only consider whether the agent sufficiently indicated his rep-
resentative capacity. In Poin the check evidenced no such in-
dication of representative capacity. Because the requirements
of section 3403 (2) (b) were not satisfied, the court should have
found the agent personally liable.
The court differed from, if it did not controvert, the intent
of the Code framers by its interpretation of section 3403 (2) (b).
As between the competing rights of the agent and the rights of
the endorsee who took as a holder in due course under the report-
ed case facts, the court permitted the agent, who did not
comply with section 3-403(2) (b) requirements, to prevail.
JAmms G. BoYD
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CRIMINAL LAW - UNEXPLAINED
POSSESSION PRINCIPLE CHALLENGED
ON FIFTH ADMENDENT GROUNDS*
Robert E. Young, convicted for breaking and entering with
intent to commit a felony, challenged on appeal the following
jury instructions as unconstitutional:
I further instruct you, that when it is known beyond a
reasonable doubt that a building has been entered and
property stolen therefrom, and soon thereafter, the property
is found in the possession of the persons charged with en-
tering the building with intent to steal, such possession
umep ained may warrant the inference that such person not
only stole the goods, but that they broke and entered the
building with intent to steal.1
The District Court of Appeal of Florida reversed his convic-
tion on the ground that the jury charge in question had violated
the defendant's fifth amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination.
2
It has long been the rule in this country that the exclusive,
personal, and unexplained possession of recently stolen goods
may give rise to an inference of guilt." This rule, which springs
from English common law,4 has been applied consistently in
cases of burglary,5 larceny, and receiving stolen goods.7 The
inference recognized is not a presumption of law, but one of
fact-an inference of "probable reasoning, as to which the court
may lay down logical tests for the guidance of the jury, but can
impose no positive binding rule."s
The "unexplained possession" rule has been held to justify a
prosecutor's comment to the jury upon the failure of an accused
* Young v. State, 203 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1967).
1. Young v. State, 203 So. 2d 650 (Fla. 1967) (emphasis added).
2. Id.
3. 1 F. WHARToN, CRINAL EvIDEN CE § 191, at 199 (11th ed. 1935); 9 J.
WIGMom, EvIDEN CE § 2513 at 417-24 (3d ed. 1940); see 46 CoLum. L Rv.
460 (1946).
4. See Regina v. Langmead, 169 Eng. Rep. 1459, 1463 (C.C. 1864).
5. 9 Am. Ju. Burglary § 64 (1937).
6. 1 F. WHARToN, CpjmiNAL EvIDENCE suPra note 3.
7. Husten v. United States, 95 F2d 168 (8th Cir. 1938).
8. 1 F. WHARTON, CRIMINAL EvIDENcE § 193, at 203 (11th ed. 1935).
9. State v. Edgeworth, 239 S.C. 10, 121 S.E2d 248 (1961).
457
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to explain,9 and has properly been the subject of jury instruc-
tions.10
In the Young case, however, the jury instruction based upon
this long-standing principle was held to be improper. Two fac-
tors contributed to this determination: (1) The decision of
Miranda v. Arizona"' which made clear the availability of the
privilege against self-incrimination during custodial interroga-
tion; and (2) the nature of Florida's interpretation of the unex-
plained possession rule.
In reference to the requirement that possession, in order to
yield an inference of guilt, must be "unexplained," the court
specified that an explanation to rebut the inference must be
offered when the accused "is first under a duty to speak after
such recently stolen property is found in his possession."'
2
Since Miranda, however, had relieved a suspect of any duty to
respond to custodial interrogation, the court concluded that an
inference of guilt could no longer be drawn from his failure
to explain:
The instruction given to the jury had the effect to demand
of the defendant an affirmative explanation for the reason
the stolen goods were in his possession. At the same time
defendant being in police custodial interrogation within the
meaning of Miranda would have had the privilege to remain
silent. The privilege to remain silent would be a hollow
privilege if that silence would create an inference of guilt
at the trial. The fact that the defendant remained silent was
used against him at trial in the form of the aforementioned
jury instruction in violation of the defendant's Fifth
Amendment privilege under the Miranda decision.'"
Under the Florida interpretation of the unexplained possession
principle, the court's finding is clearly correct. The purpose of
the fifth amendment freedom from self-incrimination is not
only to protect an individual from being coerced into giving
evidence against himself, but also to protect him from "indirect
pressure to explain incriminating evidence."' 4 Now that the
10. 1 F. WnARTON, CRIMINAL EVIDENCE supra note 3.
11. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
12. Young v. State, 203 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla. 1967).
13. Id. at 652.
14. Note, Adoptive Admission, Arrest and the Privilege Against Self In-
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fifth amendment self-incrimination clause has become binding
upon the states,15 it is imperative that in state courts and police
custody, accused persons "suffer no penalty"' 6 for choosing to
remain silent. This is clearly the mandate of Miranda'7 and the
"no-comment" decisions.'8
Referring generally to the unexplained possession rule, the
Young court stated: "Cases . . . throughout the United States
. . . [and] [flederal courts throughout the land have constantly
adhered to this principle . . . ."19 It would seem then, that the
Young decision, by invalidating a principle of such widespread
importance might have a drastic impact upon the field of crim-
inal evidence. A closer examination reveals, however, that other
jurisdictions have developed an alternate interpretation of the
principle in question. In so doing, they have avoided the fifth
amendment collision that gave rise to the Young decision.
Authorities indicate that the Florida version of the possession
rule resembles the common law rule-that the explanation to
subdue the inference of guilt must be given when the possessor
is first found with the stolen goods. 2 0 This distinction appar-
ently stems from the desirability of drawing an explanation from
the accused party "before he has had the opportunity to concoct
evidence exculpatory of himself .... 12
As this principle, was handed down through customary
judicial practice over the years,22 its original interpretation be-
came obscured. Although the vague language of case law often
left uncertain the character of the explanation required, it is
now clear that an alternate version of the rule recognizes the
guilt inference only when a reasonable explanation is not forth-
coming from all the evidence presented at triaZ.
2 a
15. Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
16. Id. at 8.
17. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
18. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965); United States v. Lo Biando,
135 F2d 130 (2d Cir. 1943); State v. Wolfe, 64 S.D. 178, 266 N.W. 116
(1936); see 14 Am. JuR. Criminal Law § 150 (1937).
19. Young v. State, 203 So. 2d 650, 651 (Fla. 1967).
20. A. WILLs, CIRCUMSTANTIAL EViDFNcE 79 (1896); Annot., 101 Am. St.
R. 474, 521 (1905); see, 1 F. WHIARToN, CRIMINAL EVIDEN E § 121, at 137
(lth ed. 1935).
21. Annot., 101 Am. St. R. 474, 521 (1905).
22. See State v. Hodge, 50 N.H. 510, 519-20 (1869).
23. Herman v. United States, 289 F.2d 362, 367 (5th Cir. 1961) ("explained
by circumstances") ; Yielding v. United States, 173 F.2d 46, 48 (5th Cir. 1949)
("explanatory facts and circumstances"); Levi v. United States, 71 F2d 353,
1968]
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South Carolina, adhering to this alternate interpretation,
states its position in State v. Winter :24
The jury is not required to look for the explanation which
removes the presumption to direct evidence; it may be found
in the attending circumstances, or in the character or habits
of the possessor or in any other fact . . . .25
Recognizing that the unexplained possession principle consists
of these variations, it is important to remember that it was the
nature of Florida's interpretation that necessitated the Young
decision. The Florida rule required an explanation from the
accused during initial police custody. Miranda, by extending the
right against self-incrimination to the arrest stage, drew the
Florida rule into conflict with the fifth amendment. Clearly
Miranda's clarification of the fifth amendment's reach would
not affect South Carolina's version of the rule, which requires
nothing more than an evidentiary explanation at trial.
Further reflection, however, gives rise to this question: If it
was impermissible "to demand of the defendant an affirma-
tive explanation for the reason the stolen goods were in his
possession," 26 why is it proper to demand that he explain that
same possession through the presentation of testimony and
other evidence at trial? The answer proceeds from an important
difference between the Florida and South Carolina interpreta-
tions: While the South Carolina rule contemplates an explana-
tion arising out of the total circumstances of the case, the
Florida rule necessarily contemplates a verbal explanation. The
Florida Supreme Court recognized this necessity in Ard v.
354 (5th Cir. 1934) ("explanatory facts and circumstances") ; State v. Hodge,
50 N.H. 510, 526 (1869) ("explanatory evidence"); State v. Winter,
83 S.C. 153, 156-57, 65 S.E. 209, 210 (1909) ("[T]he law . . . presumes him
to be the thief, unless the jury find in the whole case as presented them some
satisfactory explanation of the possession. .. .") ; 9 J. WIGmoRE, EVih:NCE
§ 2513, at 417 (3d ed. 1940) [Defendant had burden of "producing evidence, so
that if he failed to do so (that is, to offer any 'explanation') the jury must
convict . . "]; A. WILLS, CmcumsTA TqAL EvIDENcF 83 (1896); 32 Am.
Jmu Larcety § 143 (1941).
24. 83 S.C. 153, 65 S.E. 209 (1909).
25. Id. at 156, 65 S.E. at 210. The language of other South Carolina cases
is less clear. See State v. Edgeworth, 239 S.C. 10, 121 S.E.2d 248 (1961);
State v. Coleman, 226 S.C. 617, 86 S.E.2d 484 (1955); State v. Goodson, 225
S.C. 418, 82 S.E.2d 804 (1954) ; State v. Washington, 220 S.C. 442, 68 S.E2d
400 (1951); State v. Shields, 217 S.C. 496, 61 S.E.2d 56 (1950); State v.
Lyles, 211 S.C. 334, 45 S.E.2d 181 (1947); State v. Baker, 208 S.C. 195, 37
S.E.2d 525 (1946); State v. Garvin, 48 S.C. 258, 26 S.E. 570, (1896).
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State :27 "The account by one discovered with purloined prop-
erty must be 'directly' given in order for the explanation to be
one falling within the rule.128
The importance of this requirement derives from the fact that
the fifth amendment prohibition has historically been directed
toward "testimonial compulsion".2 as opposed to the conduct or
actions of the defendant. While Florida's version represents a
testimonial explanation, the South Carolina rule recognizes an
explanation forthcoming from physical evidence, the testimony
of other witnesses, and other facts and circumstances in the
case. There is ample authority for the proposition that the fifth
amendment's proscription against penalizing the accused for
failure to testify does not prohibit the drawing of an inference
of guilt from his failure to produce evidence at trial ° or from
the failure to call witnesses in his favor.81
The authorities cited for the proposition that a guilt
inference can properly be drawn from failure to present wit-
nesses and evidence, provide a useful analogy to the present ques-
tion. Those cases, however, involve specific items of evidence and
specific witnesses-known to be available to the defendant-
which he nevertheless refuses to present at trial. Thus the prose-
cutor might ask the jury, "If the defendant was with his wife
on the night of the murder, why did he not bring her into court
to testify?" According to the weight of authority, this comment
would be allowed, as the jury would be free to infer guilt from
the defendant's failure to bring an apparently available witness
into court.32 On the other hand, if the prosecutor is allowed to
comment in general language upon the failure of the defendant
to explain in court his possession of stolen goods, or if the judge
charges that the jury may infer guilt from such failure, it is
possible that the jury might interpret this comment or instruc-
27. 108 So. 2d 650, 652 (Fla. 1959).
28. Id. at 41.
29. 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 649 (1961); see State v. Fisher, 242 Ore.
419, 410 P.2d 216 (1966).
30. 8 J. WIGMoRE, EvIDENCE § 2273, at 445 (McNaughton Rev. ed. 1961);
23A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 1099 (1961); 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 594
(1961).
31. Ford v. State, 184 Tenn. 443, 201 S.W2d 539, 541 (1945); 23A CJ.S.
Criminal Law § 1099 (1961). See also State v. Ackerman, 90 Wash. 198, 155
P. 743 (1916); State v. Jackson, 83 Wash. 514, 145 P. 470 (1915) ; 16 C.J.
Criminal Law § 2249 (1918).
32. See 22A C.J.S. Criminal Law § 594 (1961).
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tion as referring to the defendant's failure to testify.33 There-
fore it is essential to the proper application of the South Carolina
rule that the jury clearly understand that they may consider as
incriminating, indicia and non-production of evidence except the
refusal of the defendant to testify.84
In conclusion it should be noted that there is a corollary to
the unexplained possession rule which remains in force even
under the Florida interpretation: If the accused offers an ex-
planation that proves either flimsy 35 or untrue36 a strong infer-
ence of guilt arises. He might otherwise waive the privilege3T in
which case the inference may arise regardless of which rule is
applied. Apparently these exceptions represent the only aspects
of the Florida rule which have survived the Young decision.
The decision in the Young case should have no direct effect on
the South Carolina rule. It does serve, however, to bring atten-
tion to the uncertain and ever-changing nature of this area of
the law.88 While such uncertainty renders increasingly clear the
need for care and deliberation on the part of the trial judge,
general authority predicts that the South Carolina rule will re-
main in effect with no immediate fifth amendment confrontation.
DA L T. BRAmspoim
33. See 23A CJ.S. Crininal Law § 1098 (1961).
34. See, 8 J. WIGUoaE, EVIDENCE § 2273 (McNaughton Rev. ed. 1961);
State v. Hodge, 50 N.H. 510, 527-29 (1869).
35. Romanello v. State, 160 So. 2d 529, 534 (Fla. Ct. App. 1964), cert.
denied, 381 U.S. 915 (1965).
36. A. WILLS, CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 86 (1896).
37. See note Miranda and Waiver, 4 WiL.mXETrE L.J. 205 (1966).
38. See note Real Evidence and the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 4




Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE - PROHIBITION
AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION UNDER THE
FEDERAL WAGERING TAX STATUTES*
The petitioner, Marchetti, was convicted in the United States
District Court of Connecticut under two indictments: First,
that the petitioner and others conspired to evade payment of the
annual occupational tax imposed by Title 26, Section 4411 of the
United States Code; second, that petitioner willfully refused to
pay the occupational tax and to register his gambling activities
as required by Title 26, Section 4412 of the United States Code
before engaging in the business of accepting wages. The Court
of Appeals for the Second Circuit affirmed1 on the authority
of United States v. Kahriger2 and Lewis v. United States." In
overruling Kahriger and Lewis, the Supreme Court in Marchetti
v. United States4 held that the scheme of the gambling tax
statute violated the petitioner's privilege against self-incrimi-
nation and hence that no criminal prosecution arising from a
violation of the taxing statute could be sustained against the
petitioner.
In Marchetti the Court confronted four issues, all of which
were related to self-incrimination.
First, the Court had to consider the determination made in
Kahriger and Lewis that the gambling tax statute was prospec-
tive in its application and the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion did not attach to prospective acts.
Second, the Court had to consider the alternative holding in
Kahriger and Lewis that an individual waives his privilege
against self-incrimination by entering into the field of gambling.
Third, the court had to decide whether the information re-
quired was subject to the "required records" doctrine enunciated
in Shapiro v. United States.5
Fourth, the Court had to determine whether the doctrine of
immunity arising from Murphy v. Waterfront Commission0 could
be made applicable to the facts in Marchetti. The Court acknowl-
* Marchetti v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 697 (1968).
1. United States v. Marchetti, 352 F.2d 848 (2d Cir. 1965).
2. 345 U.S. 22 (1953).
3. 348 U.S. 419 (1955).
4. 88 S.Ct. 697 (1968).
5. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
6. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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edged Murphy and the fact that the present gambling tax statute
contained no immunity provision. The issue, therefore, was
whether the court could grant immunity to the defendants from
federal and state prosecution when the statute had no immunity
provision.
Because of the complexity and confusing nature of these
issues, each will be discussed separately in an attempt to analyze
the application of these concepts to the all-encompassing issue
of self-incrimination.
I. PRosPEcTI AcTs
The court in United ,States v. Kahriger held that the gambling
tax statute was valid because the prospective gambler would not
engage in wagering activities until after he had complied with
the gambling statute. And, at the time of registering, therefore,
the petitioner had committed no overt act to which the privilege
against self-incrimination could attach. By this holding, the
Court established a rigid chronological test; namely, that the
privilege against self-incrimination applies to past and present
actsT but does not apply to future acts.
The Marchetti Court recognized, however, that this test fails
to meet certain constitutional standards.
First the danger of self-incrimination need not arise from evi-
dence which directly incriminates. It need only present a link
in the chain which could eventually lead to a conviction."
It is logical to conclude that the disclosure sections of the
gambling statute would provide a "link in the chain" to future
prosecutions. Because of this conclusion, the chronological
rigidity of a "prospective acts" test fails to shield the individual
from self-incrimination. In order to document this holding, the
Marohetti Court pointed to the unity of the states in combatting
gambling activities.9 State authorities could use the informa-
tion obtained through the registration requirement of the
7. See also Communist Party v. United States, 331 F.2d 807 (D.C. Cir.
1963), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 968 (1964) ; Russell v. United States, 306 F2d
402 (9th Cir. 1962) (cannot require registration of illegally possessed firearms
if the registration will bring to the attention of the government the unlavful
act of possession).
8. Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479 (1951); Blau v. United States,
340 U.S. 159 (1950).
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statutes 0 to alert themselves to the intention of the individual
who registered. By closely scrutinizing the activities of this in-
dividual, the state authorities could arrest him when he did en-
gage in his gambling activities and initiate a criminal prosecu-
tion against him. Thus, even though an individual's gambling
activities are to be carried out at some future point in time, the
fact that he is made to disclose his future intentions provides a
"link in the chain" which might lead to his conviction when he
does begin his gambling activities.
The Court also pointed out that a criminal prosecution may
arise from the link of evidence provided by the gambling statute
although an individual decides not to enter into wagering ac-
tivities. A person may be convicted under state law in some
jurisdictions if he compires to enter into wagering activities.'1
In this situation, the overt act of gambling is prospective yet the
individual is prosecuted criminally because of the link of evi-
dence supplied by the disclosure sections of the gambling act
which indicate an individual's desire to gamble in the future.
The Marchetti Court made a further attack on the prospective
acts test. The Court conceded that in order for the privilege
against self-incrimination to attach, an individual must suffer
a real and not merely an imaginary possibility of self-incrimin-
ation.12 In other words, if the possibility of self-incrimination
is too remote, the privilege will not attach. The Court, however,
had only to look at past judicial decisions to recognize that the
gambling statutes had been used previously to secure criminal
convictions and therefore posed a real threat of self-incrimina-
tion to potential gamblers.13 With this finding of fact, the Court
held that although the act of gambling is subsequent to the date
10. 26 U.S.C. § 6806(c) (1964) (posting revenue stamps in their place of
business or keeping them on their person to be exhibited on demand by a
treasury official); 26 U.S.C. §§ 4403, 4423 (1964) (requiring daily records
of gross amount of wages received and permitting inspection of these books
or records) ; 26 U.S.C. § 4422 (1964) (payment of the wagering tax does not
exempt person from any penalty under the laws of the United States or any
state) ; 26 U.S.C. § 6107 (1964) (requiring each internal revenue office to
maintain a list of occupational taxpayers for public inspection and to provide
a certified copy of these listings to any state or local prosecuting officer).
11. Acklen v. State, 196 Tenn. 314, 267 S.W2d 101 (1954).
12. See, Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951); Mason v. United
States, 244 U.S. 362 (1917) ; Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1898).
13. See, e.g., Irwin v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954); United States v.
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of registration and such act is therefore prospective, an indi-
vidual is threatened with a real possibility of self-incrimination,
and because of this threat, the disclosure provisions of the statute
violate an individual's fifth amendment privilege against self-
incrimination.
In cases in which the privilege against self-incrimination is
invoked, "[s]ociety's interest in having a full disclosure of all
criminal activity must be balanced against the right of the indi-
vidual to be free from unrestrained government inquisition."
14
A rigid chronological test under the circumstances of the
Marohetti case will not provide this protection. Although the
act of gambling is prospective with respect to the filling out of
the disclosure provisions of the gambling statute, such disclosure,
is most instances, will invariably result in a criminal conviction.
I. WAIVER
The Constitution grants certain rights and privileges to indi-
viduals who are citizens of the United States, and no act or
manifestation of intention is required of the individual in order
to have these rights and privileges attach. The privilege against
self-incrimination is one of the rights bestowed upon individuals.
These privileges can, however, be waived by an individual if
certain conditions occur. The Supreme Court has held that the
privilege against self-incrimination is one of the constitutional
guarantees which can be waived.15
Although the privilege against self-incrimination can be
waived, the Court presumes against waiver.'6 To prevent the
unwary from inadvertently waiving his constitutional rights,
the Court has generally applied the test that in order for there
to be a waiver, an individual must have "meaningfully" waived
his rights.'
7
The courts have been able to set certain standards by which
the test of "meaningful" has been applied. Through the judicial
14. McKee, The Fifth Amendment and the Federal Gambling Tax, 5 DuxE
B.J. 86, 86 (1956).
15. See, e.g., Redfield v. United States, 315 F.2d 76 (9th Cir. 1963) (waiver
by testimony) ; United States v. Field, 193 F.2d 92 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 342
U.S. 894 (1951) (waiver by contract).
16. Aetna Ins. Co. v. Kennedy, 301 U.S. 389 (1937); Ohio Bell Tel. Co. v.
Public Util. Comm'n, 301 U.S. 292 (1937); Hodges v. Easton, 106 U.S.
408 (1882).
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process the standards have adequately covered most express
waivers; that is, a case in which the individual has expressed an
affirmative intention to disclaim a constitutional right or privi-
lege. The Marchetti Court, however, was faced with a far more
difficult problem-the problem of an implied waiver.
An implied waiver occurs by operation of law. Because of an
individual's participation in certain acts, the law states that he
has disclaimed his constitutional right. Thus, the difference
between an express waiver and an implied waiver is that in the
former, the individual waives his protection under the privilege
and in the latter his protection is waived by operation of the law.
The Court in Marchetti was faced with the authority of two
prior decisions in deciding the issue of whether the petitioner
had impliedly waived his privilege against self-incrimination.
First, in United States v. SuZlivan,18 the petitioner failed to
file his income tax form because a portion of his income came
from activities which violated the National Prohibition Act.
In an attempt to justify his refusal to comply, the petitioner
asserted his privilege against self-incrimination. The Court de-
cided that the petitioner could not refuse to file a return under
the cover of the privilege. Instead, the Court asserted, the peti-
tioner should have filed his return claiming his privilege to the
specific question asked by the form which tended to incrimi-
nate him. By not filing his return, the Court held that he had
waived his privilege to the information required by his income
tax return.
The Marchetti decision, on the other hand, followed the pre-
sumption against waivers of constitutional rights as its basic
premise. It reasoned that if the petitioner had to claim his privi-
lege at the time of registration, he would be admitting his guilt
in order to claim the privilege. Since an individual can assert
the privilege at trial and the petitioner did assert his privilege
at that time, the Court held that there had been no previous
"meaningful" waiver of the privilege. The petitioner had per-
formed all of the duties required in asserting the defense of the
privilege.
Second, in Lewis v. United States,19 under facts very similar
to those of the Marchetti case, the Court found an implied waiver
18. 274 U.S. 259 (1927).
19. 348 U.S. 419 (1955),
1968]
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of the privilege against self-incrimination. The Court stated
that there was no constitutionally protected right to gamble.
Therefore, the petitioner had a choice: to engage in gambling
or to refrain from gambling. If he chose the former, his rights
under the privilege were waived in respect to the information
required under the disclosure provisions of the gambling statute.
The Court, therefore, found an implied waiver if an individual
chose to gamble. The Marchetti Court overruled Lewis, holding
that there had been no "meaningful" waiver. Because there is no
constitutionally protected right to gamble, it does not necessarily
follow that the privilege against self-incrimination does not
attach to an individual engaged in gambling. Both guilty and
innocent parties, the Court asserted, are protected by the privi-
lege unless they have meaningfully waived their privilege.20 In
fact it is primarily the accused who is in need of the privilege.
The Marchetti Court could have taken another step toward
strengthening its position against implied waivers. Rogers v.
United States,21 held that if an individual testifies as to fact,
he waives the privilege as to detail surrounding that fact. The
Court could have accepted this rule and held that the petitioner
in refusing to register specifically reserved his privilege. Had
the petitioner admitted his gambling activities, he would, at the
same time, have been waiving his right with respect to the details
surrounding his activities. By not submitting his intentions of
gambling, however, the petitioner could have expressly reserved
his privilege pertaining to those facts surrounding his activities.
Although failing to encompass Rogers, Marchetti rejected Suli-
van and Lewis, and in effect, refused to accept waiver by impli-
cation. After Marchetti the only method in which to waive
meaningfully is to waive expressly and intelligently one's rights
to constitutional protections and privileges.
By rejecting the implied waiver theory, Marchetti has narrow-
ed the ability of prosecutors to by-pass this personal defense and
has broadened the scope of the privilege in protecting the indi-
vidual. As stated in United States v. White,22 "the immediate
and potential evils of compulsory self-disclosure transcend any
difficulties that the exercise of the privilege may impose on
20. 88 S. Ct. 697, 704 (1968).
21. 340 U.S. 367 (1951).
22. 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
23
et al.: Comments
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society in the detection and prosecution of crime. 23 The Court
has removed one of the obstacles obstructing the practical appli-
cation of this quote.
Having considered the application of the waiver theory in
Mtarchetti, the question now arises: Is the test of "meaningful-
ness" used by Marchetti restricted to this particular factual sit-
uation or will this rejection of implied waiver filter into other
self-incrimination areas? With the Court's emphatic desire to
protect the individual's constitutional rights and its apparent
abhorrence of waiver of constitutional rights, it is more than
mere speculation to assume that this rejection of implied waiver
of the privilege will be carried into other areas. If such an ex-
tension is not made, an individual's privilege against self-in-
crimination could be watered down to uselessness by "ingeniously
drawn legislation" 24 as attempted in Marchetti.
III. REQUIRED RECORDS Doc=RNE
The "required records doctrine" states basically that in some
instances, records must be kept and handed over to proper
authorities on demand, whether they will incriminate an individ-
ual or not. If the records involved do come within this category,
the privilege against self-incrimination does not attach to their
contents. To understand the doctrine, a brief survey of its de-
velopment will be helpful.
In Boyd v. United StateS, 2 5 the privilege against self-incrim-
ination was held to attach to books and papers of individual
citizens. The use of these documents by the government was held
to be repugnant to the fourth and fifth amendment guarantees
against unlawful search and seizure and self-incrimination.
With the increasing need of government regulations, the Boyd
decision was later limited to "natural persons,"26 and did not
apply to organizations. The Court later declared that the privi-
lege did not attach to corporate documents, 7 documents of labor
23. Id. at 698.
24. Morgan, The Privilege Against Self-Incrimination, 34 MiNN. L. REv. 1,
37 (1949).
25. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
26. See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Communist Party v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 223 F2d 531 (D.C. Cir. 1954), rev'd on
other grounds, 351 U.S. 115 (1956).
27. United States v. Bausch & Lomb Optical Co., 321 U.S. 707 (1944).
1968]
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unions, 28 and documents of partnerships.29 As previously
stated, these restrictions on the availability of the privilege
against self-incrimination were upheld although the custodians
of the documents might have been incriminated by the contents.
The Court, moreover, has reasoned that a custodian of documents
could not claim that the documents were private only to himself
and therefore could not claim the privilege to them because an
individual may claim the privilege only as to property which is
private to himself.80
By interjecting these two tests-whether the property being
required was the private property of the individual asserting his
privilege against self-incrimination, and whether the property
being required belonged to a natural person-the government was
able to enforce many of their regulatory programs.
The reasoning flowing from this line of cases was expanded
in Shapiro v. United States.81 By declaring that records re-
quired by law to be maintained by an individual acquired "public
aspects,182 the Court held that the privilege did not attach, be-
cause the individual did not have a completely vested interest in
the documents and, therefore, became only the custodian of the
documents.3 3 This interpretation espoused in Shapiro has become
known as the "required records doctrine."
The question facing the Mar hetti Court was whether the
records required of the petitioner fit into the "required records
doctrine." The Court distinguished the present set of circum-
stances from those circumstances involved in Shapiro. In
Shapiro the required records were "of a kind ordinarily kept.
' 4
In contrast the petitioner, Marchetti, was required to keep rec-
ords which were automatically going to subject him to a criminal
prosecution. The records ordered to be kept in the Shapiro case
would not incriminate an individual unless he subsequently en-
tered into an illegal activity. In Marchetti, the petitioner was
28. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
29. United States v. Silverstein, 314 F.2d 789 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 374
U.S. 807 (1963).
30. United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944); Wilson v. United States,
221 U.S. 361 (1911); Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
31. 335 U.S. 1 (1948).
32. Id. at 33-34.
33. Comspare Shapiro v. United States, 335 U.S. 1 (1948), with United
States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
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guilty of a crime before he entered into his gambling activities.
To require someone to keep incriminating records, in effect, re-
sults in a coerced confession; and coerced confessions should
never result from records "of a kind ordinarily kept."
Furthermore, the Marchetti Court pointed out that the govern-
ment's desire to obtain information does not, in itself, cause
records to take on "public aspects" of the kind found in Shapiro.
If this desire alone was enough to bring certain records into the
Shapiro rule, the government could pass legislation similar to
the gambling statutes; and by requiring information to be given
to government officials, the privilege against self-incrimination
could be reduced to a nullity by the Congress. 5
The Court in Marchetti pointed out a further distinguishing
characteristic between Shapiro and Marchetti. The information
required in Shapiro was aimed at an area which was essentially
non-criminal, whereas the information required in A[archetti
came from an area essentially criminal in nature.3 6 It is worth
noting this distinction for two reasons: First, it simply gave
the Marchetti Court a reason to distinguish its case and bring it
outside of the "required records doctrine"; second, and possibly
more important, the Court appears to indicate that it will look
closely at an area invaded by legislative acts when that area
involves a possible criminal sanction. In this case, the Congress
has the power to tax. It used this power, however, to acquire
information leading to criminal convictions. It is difficult to
determine if the court will apply this reasoning to other situa-
tions in which a governmental agency has entered into a criminal
area under the pretense of another legitimate reason. Since the
Court did not adequately distinguish Shapiro nor set limits for
its application, it could reasonably be assumed that Shapiro has
been overruled sub silentio, at least when its application is chal-
lenged under the fifth amendment.
IV. ImmuNITY , Tim DUAL SovmmiGNTY RuLE
Simply stated, dual sovereignty provides that the states and
the federal government are separate and equal entities. Under
this formulation determinations by one sovereign will not neces-
sarily bind the other. This rule has been applied distinctly in
the area of criminal procedure.




South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [2020], Art. 5
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol20/iss3/5
SouTm CAaoiaOA LAW REvmw
In the area of self-incrimination, the question of dual sover-
eignty customarily arises in the following context. Either a
state or the federal government will pass a law which requires
an individual to turn over certain materials to the authorities
or to give testimony pertinent to specific issues to certain judi-
cial or quasi-judicial authorities. In order to prevent running
afoul of the self-incrimination guarantee granted to the testi-
fying witness, the federal or state statute requiring disclosure
will contain an immunity provision which will prohibit a prose-
cution of the witness by using the evidence given in testimony as
a basis for such prosecution. Under the dual sovereignty rule,
however, the other sovereign, either the state or the federal gov-
ernment, would not be affected by the respective immunity
statute and could, therefore, use the evidence acquired by the
other sovereign to prosecute the defendant under its own laws.
In Counmel v. Hitchcock,3 7 the Court addressed itself only to
the validity of an immunity statute. There it was held that the
National Immunity Act 3 s was not broad enough to protect the
individual's privilege against self-incrimination, and that the
individual could not be forced to give testimony.
Four years later, the court reversed its decision and held that
the National Immunity Act of 1893 was broad enough to pro-
tect the individual's privilege, therefore, the individual could
be forced to testify.3 9
These two early cases were not involved with dual sovereignty
however, and had not decided whether a grant of immunity by
one sovereign would bind the other sovereign. The Court had
been concerned only with the question of whether an individual
could be forced to give testimony when an immunity provision,
granted by the sovereign initiating the questioning, provided for
protection against prosecution by the sovereign arising from
the testimony which was given.
In Balkman v. FagiAo the Court was confronted with the issue
of dual sovereignty. The defendant was subpoenaed to appear
before a federal grand jury to present certain testimony. He
pleaded his fifth amendment privilege against self-incrimina-
tion contending that if he gave this evidence, he would be sub-
37. 142 U.S. 547 (1892).
38. National Innunity Act, 15 Stat. 37 (1868).
39. Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
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jecting himself to state prosecution. Justice Holmes, speaking
for the majority, held that the defendant's contention was valid
and that he could not be made to testify.
In United States v. Murdock,4 however, the Court specifically
adopted the dual sovereignty rule when it stated that the federal
government could compel a witness to give testimony which
might be used against him in a state proceeding.
Following the rule stated in Murdock, the Court, in Feldman
v. United States42 held that a state may force disclosure from an
individual which may later result in a criminal prosecution in
a federal proceeding. In Knapp v. Schweitzer48 the Court af-
firmed its position pertaining to the dual sovereignty rule as
applied in Feldman.
It should be understood that the dual sovereignty rule was ap-
plicable even though a state or the federal government had
granted an immunity to the testimony given. The sovereign
which granted the immunity was bound, but the sovereign
granting the immunity could not bind the other sovereign by
enacting an immunity provision.
Certain inroads, however, were subsequently made on the
dual sovereignty rule. In Adams v. Maryland,44 the Court im-
plied that a national immunity provision could be passed which
would bar a subsequent state criminal proceeding using the evi-
dence acquired by the federal government. Later, in Mills v.
Louisiana,5 the dissent argued that when there was collabora-
tion between state and federal authorities for the purpose of
obtaining testimony from a witness in a state proceeding, the
federal authorities should be barred from using this testimony
in a federal prosecution. The dissent argued that this element
of collaboration would enable the state and federal authorities
to circumvent an individual's privilege against self-incrimina-
tion.
These cases were decided before the federal standard of pro-
tection under the fifth amendment privilege against self-incrim-
ination was applied against the states. 'Until this time, the states
41. 290 U.S. 389 (1933).
42. 322 U.S. 487 (1944).
43. 357 U.S. 371 (1958).
44. 347 U.S. 179 (1954). See also Brown v. Walker, 161 U.S. 591 (1896).
45. 360 U.S. 230 (1959).
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were bound by their own constitutional self-incrimination clauses
and the federal government was bound by the fifth amendment.
In 1964 the Court decided MaZloy v. Hoga 48 and the fifth
amendment privilege was incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment's due process clause. For the first time the states and
the federal government had the same standard to be used in
applying the privilege against self-incrimination.
It was no longer practical to apply dual sovereignty in the
area of self-incrimination because the standard for applying
the privilege was the same in both state and federal govern-
ments. Therefore, if an individual had a valid defense under the
privilege in either a state or federal proceeding, the other sov-
ereign could not use this testimony due to the Court's incorpora-
tion of the fifth amendment privilege into the fourteenth
amendment.
Logically following this abolition of the dual sovereignty rule,
the Court, in Murphy v. Waterfront Commission,47 held that
both states and federal immunity statutes would operate to give
immunity to an individual against a subsequent prosecution in
the jurisdiction of the other sovereign. If the standard of ap-
plying the privilege was to be the same in both federal and state
prosecutions, an immunity statute granted by one sovereign
should operate against the other sovereign.
The Marchetti decision, however, refused to read an implied
immunity provision into the gambling tax statute.48 Reasoning
that it is the duty of the Congress to enact laws, the Court stated
that it could not upset the scheme of the statute by implying an
immunity provision. To do so, would have destroyed the con-
gressional intent to have the information disclosed under the
gambling statute made available to state authorities.49 Instead,
the Court left the duty of amending the statute to meet consti-
tutional requirements to the Congress, while implying that an
immunity provision would save the statute.
46. 378 U.S. 1 (1964).
47. 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
48. 83 S. Ct. 6971 708-09 (1968). It is submitted that, as a practical matter,
the Court did not imply an immunity, for to do so would have had the effect
of destroying state gambling legislation.
49. 26 U.S.C. § 6107 (1964) (provides for the turning over of information
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If Congress should hereafter conclude that a full dis-
closure ...by the witness is of greater importance than
the possibility of punishing them for some crime in the
past, it can, as in other cases, confer power of unrestricted
examination by providing complete immunity.50
V. CoNCw-sIoN
The Court in Marchetti had to struggle with four aspects of
self-incrimination in concluding that the petitioner's privilege
had been violated. First, the Court adhered to the philosophy
that the constitutional privilege could not be restricted by a
rigid chronological test. The guarantee is to be applied liberally
in procuring the protecting of the individual. Second, the Court
concluded that in order to find a waiver of the constitutional
guarantee of the privilege against self-incrimination, the waiver
at least under the facts of this particular case, cannot be im-
plied. It must, moreover, be "meaningfully" waived. Third, the
Court held that the facts of the case were not within the "re-
quired records doctrine" because to do so would enable Congress
to demand all records sought for any reason. Fourth, the Court
would not apply an immunity provision within the gambling
statute in order to save it, leaving this determination to the
Congress.
There is no doubt that the Congress may levy taxes and an
incidental regulatory effect will not cause the tax to be stricken
as being unconstitutional. 51 The intent of tax laws, however,
must be to raise revenues and not to penalize.52
Considering the surrounding circumstances, the Court, in
effect, held that the gambling tax statute was instituted for the
purpose of enabling the states to improve enforcement of their
criminal prohibitions against gamblers. 53  The Marchetti deci-
50. McCarthy v. Arndstein, 266 U.S. 34, 42 (1924).
51. See McCray v. United States, 195 U.S. 27 (1904); Veazie Bank v.
Fenno, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 533 (1869).
52. United States v. Constantine, 296 U.S. 287 (1935). See also United
States v. One Ford Coupe, 272 U.S. 321 (1926) ; United States v. Stafoff, 260
U.S. 477 (1923).
53. 97 CONG. Rac. 12232 (1951) (discussion by Senator Kefauver on how
to combat illegal gambling activities) ; 97 CONG. REc. 6891 (1951) (colloquy be-
tween representatives Cooper and Hoffman on how to combat illegal gambling
activities). Compare Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) ; United
States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1963); with the fact that the gambling stamp
could be purchased for $50.00 and represented only nominal revenues tending
toward the presumption that the tax statute was not passed for the primary
purpose of collecting revenues.
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sion "echoed" the dissent of Justice Black and Justice Douglas
in Kahriger that the gambling tax statute was put into effect as
"a squeezing device contrived to put a man in federal prison
if he refuses to confess himself into state prison . . . 54
The extent to which the Marchetti decision will be broadened
in the future cannot be presently answered. It is, however,
feasible to contend that when legislation is enacted toward a
group of individuals engaged in "an area permeated with crim-
inal statutes," and "inherently suspect of criminal activities"55
the Court will look for a protection of the individual's privilege
against self-incrimination within the statutory scheme. Without
such protection, the statute will probably be stricken.
The question, however, remains whether this ideal of the
individual's immunity from coerced prosecution can be
reconciled with the governmental need for information in
a complex modern society.56
MICHAM W. S~rr
54. 345 U.S. 22, 36 (1953).
55. Marchetti v. United States, 88 S. Ct. 697, 702 (1968); Albertson v.
Subversive Activities Control Bd., 382 U.S. 70, 79 (1965).
56. Note, Required Information and the Privilege Against Self-Incritnina-
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FEDERAL TAXATION-EFFECT OF A PREVIOUS
STATE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION OF
A PROPERTY INTEREST IN A FEDERAL
COURT TAX CONTROVERSY*
During the past three decades a conflict has developed among
the federal circuits with respect to the degree to which the fed-
eral authorities, in a federal tax controversy, are required to fol-
low the state t'Oa court's determination of a property right
created under the state law. The United States Supreme Court
has determined that the revenue laws are to be construed in the
light of their general purpose in order to establish a nation-wide
scheme of taxation which is uniform in its application.' When
Congress imposes a federal criterion with respect to the taxabil-
ity of income or property, moreover, the federal authorities are
"not bound by a state court's decision with respect to whether
the federal test . . .has been met."2 On the other hand, the
Supreme Court has recognized that the "necessary implication"
of the applicable statute might require that state law govern
property rights with respect to whether the particular item was
intended to be taxed. If Congress fixes a tax on the possibility
of the revesting of property or the distribution of income, the
"necessary implication" is that the state law is to determine the
possibility because the power to transfer or distribute assets is
created by state law.3 The Court, however, has placed a general
qualification upon this state control :4
[S]tate law creates legal interests and rights. The federal
revenue acts designate what interest, or right, so created
* Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
1. United States v. Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399, 402 (1941).
2. Gallagher v. Smith, 223 F.2d 218, 222 (3d Cir. 1955). See also Helvering
v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1942); Goodwin's Estate v. Commissioner,
201 F2d 576 (6th Cir. 1953). In Falk v. Commissioner, 189 F.2d 806 (3d Cir.
1951) the court said of the monies received by the taxpayer for the purposes
of distributing to charities, that it was a federal question and that "the or-
phans' court cannot ... decide issues of federal tax law and thus hamper the
effective enforcement of a valid federal tax levied against earned income."
Id. at 810.
3. Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 161-62 (1942); United States v.
Pelzer, 312 U.S. 399 (1941); Freuler v. Helvering, 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
See also Cahn, Local Law in Federal Taxation, 52 YALE L. J. 799 (1943),
which stated "[i]f the federal courts eventually do assume exclusive jurisdic-
tion, they will find state law indispensible as to the meaning and effect of
individual wills, even as to the purport of a clause directing apportionment
of the tax." Id. at 813.
4. Morgan v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78 (1940).
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shall be taxed.... If it is found in a given case that an
interest or right created by local law was the object intend-
ed to be taxed, the federal law must prevail no matter what
name is given to the interest or right by state law.5
In order to understand recent Supreme Court developments,
this federal-state controversy should be discussed through a
brief analysis of the conflict among the circuits.
I. Tim PRoB, num-HsTo0mcA ASPECTS
It has been recognized that the character of a property right
may have a direct effect upon the tax consequences in a federal
tax controversy and that state law may be used to determine the
property rights of the parties involved. Which judicial author-
ity makes this determination of the property rights, however, has
led to much confusion. In developing an answer, courts have
asked themselves the question: Was the federal authority con-
clusively bound by the decision of a state triaZ court as to the
property rights of the parties? If they were not conclusively
bound, in what situations were the authorities to adhere to the
decisions of a state trial court?
Freuler v. Helvering6 was the first major case to involve re-
liance on a state trial court's decision in the adjudication of a
federal tax question. The Supreme Court viewed the decision
of the lower court of the state as a "declaration of the law of
the State," even though the decision was not based on a statute
or an earlier decision.7 The Court subsequently reaffirmed its
position in Blair v. Commissioner.8 In determining the validity
of an assignment of income under a testamentary trust, the
Court took the position that the "decision of the state court"
must be accepted as controlling so far as it is found that the
local law is determinative of any material point in controversy.9
In both Freuler and Blair, however, the Supreme Court indi-
cated that the state proceeding was not controlling when it was
collusive "in the sense that all parties joined in a submission of
5. Id. at 80, 81.
6. 291 U.S. 35 (1934).
7. Id. at 45.
8. 300 U.S. 5 (1937).
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the issue and sought a decision which would adversely affect the
Government's right to additional . .. taxes."'1
The federal circuits generally agree that they are not bound
by a state court's decision on a material point in controversy if
it is determined that the state tria court's decision was obtained
by collusion or fraud. 1 Under these circumstances the courts
will usually make an independent investigation regarding the
proper state law with respect to the federal question at hand.
Since the Freuler and Blair decisions, however, the circuit courts
have established individual criteria absent collusion, for deter-mining the effect that should be given to a decision of a state
trial court.
In Gallagher v. Smith 2 the Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that when federal tax liability is governed by state
property law, and if the issue is fairly presented to the state court
for an independent judgment, if the judgment is binding upon
the parties under state law, it is conclusive of the property rights
in federal tax cases "regardless of whether the parties occupied
adversary positions in the state court or were all on the same
side of the question." 13
In Faulkerson v. United States' 4 the Seventh Circuit refused
to adhere to the judgment of the state court because it determined
that, under the circumstances, the judgment was contrary to
Indiana state law.'5 This decision was later interpreted to have
reached the opposite conclusion than that reached in Gallagher.'6
In a third approach Pierpont v. Commissioner17 held that the
state trial court adjudication is binding only in cases in which
10. Peyton's Estate v. Commissioner, 323 F2d 438, 444 (8th Cir. 1963).
See generally Blair v. Commissioner, 300 U.S. 5 (1937) ; Freuler v. Helvering,
291 U.S. 35 (1934).
11. E.g., Pierpont v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964); Peyton's
Estate v. Commissioner, 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963); Darlington v. Commis-
sioner, 302 F.2d 693 (3d Cir. 1962); Faulkerson v. United States, 301 F.2d
231 (7th Cir. 1962).
12. 223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
13. Id. at 225. See also Darlington v. Commissioner, 302 F2d 693 (3d
Cir. 1962) ; Goodwin v. Commissioner, 201 F.2d 576 (6th Cir. 1953).
14. 301 F.2d 231 (7th Cir. 1962).
15. Id. at 232. In this case the judgment was entered in a state court in
ex parte proceedings, without notice to anyone, without appearances, without
a hearing on the merits and without reference to other provisions of the will.
See also Stallworth v. Commissioner, 260 F.2d 760 (5th Cir. 1958); Sweet
v. Commissioner, 234 F.2d 401 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 878 (1956).
16. Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
17. 336 F2d 277 (4th Cir. 1964).
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the judgment is the result of an adversary proceeding in the
state trial court.'8
In effect some courts made independent determination of
property rights while some circuits accepted state court deci-
sions only when the proceedings were adversary in nature.
Others asserted that if the state adjudication was binding upon
the parties as to their property rights, then it was also binding
on the federal authorities.
In Peyton's Estate v. Commissioner19 a federal district court
clarified the latter position stating that a non-adversary charac-
ter of a state court's proceeding does not show collusion; but
rather that the non-adversary character is relevant evidence to
be considered by the federal authorities. The court stated that:
[B]y the word collusion, we do not mean to imply fraudulent
or improper conduct, but simply that all interested parties
agreed to the order and that it was apparently to their ad-
vantage from a tax standpoint to do so. We mean that
there was no genuine issue of law or fact as to the right of
the beneficiary to receive this income, and no bona fide con-
troversy between the trustee and beneficiary as to property
rights .... 20
With these conflicting views among the circuits, and sometimes
within a single circuit, the stage was set for the Supreme Court
to resolve the issue after thirty years of silence.
II. Tm BoscH CASE
In Commissioner v. Bosch,21 the decedent, a resident of New
York, created in favor of his wife a revocable trust over which
she had a general power of appointment. In 1951 the wife exe-
cuted an instrument purporting to release the general power of
appointment in favor of a special power. If this release were
valid, the trust would not qualify for the marital deduction
under section 2056 of the 1954 Internal Revenue Code. At the
death of Mr. Bosch in 1957, his estate took a marital deduction
for the value of the trust. The Commissioner of Internal Rev-
18. See also Merchants Nat'I Bank & Trust Co. v. United States, 246 F.2d
410, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1957).
19. 323 F.2d 438 (8th Cir. 1963).
20. Id. at 444. See also Saulsbury v. United States, 199 F.2d 578, 580 (5th
Cir. 1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 906 (1953).
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enue denied the deduction claiming that the previous release
allegedly creating a special power of appointment was valid.
Pending litigation in the Tax Court, the estate filed a petition
in the Supreme Court of New York. The state court held that
"the release was a nullity. The Tax Court regarded the judgment
of the state court as an "authoritative exposition of New York
law and adjudication of the property right involved."2 2 On
for the value of the trust. The Commissioner of Internal Rev-
appeal the court of appeals affirmed stating that the test was
"not whether the federal court is 'bound by' the decision of the
state tribunal, but whether or not a state tribunal has authori-
tatively determined the rights under state law of a party to the
federal action.
23
In the companion case, Becond National Bank v. United
Btates,24 the decedent's will and codicil had provided that one-
third of the residuary estate should be held in trust for the dece-
dent's widow, who was given a general testamentary power of
appointment over the corpus. This portion of the trust, there-
fore, qualified for the marital deduction under section 2056
(b) (6). Under Connecticut law a bequest, which is exempt from
estate taxes does not bear the burden of the taxes for the non-
exempt portion of the estate unless the testator otherwise directs.
The testator had indicated in his will that "the provisions of any
statute requiring the appointment or proration of [estate] taxes
. . .shall be without effect in the settlement of my estate." The
widow claimed the trust as part of the marital deduction and
it was computed as one-third of the residue of the estate before
the payment of federal estate taxes. The Commissioner disal-
lowed the claimed deduction and required that the estate tax be
charged to the full estate including the wife's share of the trust.
The petitioner filed an application in the state probate court to
determine, under state law, the proration of the federal taxes
paid. In a non-adversary proceeding the court found that the
entire tax was to be charged against the two-thirds portion not
attributable to the wife. The Commissioner rejected this decision.
The petitioner paid a deficiency and brought suit in the United
22. Estate of Bosch, 43 T.C. 120, 124 (1964).
23. Commissioner v. Bosch, 363 F.2d 1009, 1014 (2d Cir. 1965). In this
situation the circuit court was accepting the rationale in Gallagher v. Smith,
223 F.2d 218 (3d Cir. 1955).
24. 387 U.S. 456 (1967).
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States District Court for a refund.25 The district court upheld
the judgment of the state court, and the Commissioner appealed.
The federal circuit court of appeals reversed, holding that the
Commissioner was not bound by the determination of the Con-
necticut court and that the taxes were to be charged to the entire




The Supreme Court of the United States, on appeal, affirmed
the Second Circuit decision in Second NationaZ Bank and re-
versed and remanded the same circuit in Bosch. The Court held
that when the federal estate tax liability turns on the character
of a property interest held and transferred by the decedent un-
der state law, federal authorities are not bound by the determina-
tion made of such property interest by a state trial court.2 7 In
effect the Court "views itself" as accepting the position that the
federal authority will consider itself bound only by state law as
determined by the highest court of the state.28
The Court in arriving at its conclusion utilized guarded and
narrow language and appeared to restrict its holding to situa-
tions in which the marital deduction in federal estate taxation
is involved. 29 The majority employed a report of the Senate
Finance Committee which recommended the enactment of the
marital deduction. From this the majority determined that
"' proper regard' not finality 'should be given to interpretation
of the will' by state courts and then only when entered by a
court 'in a bona fide adversary proceeding.' ' 8o
The majority limited the discussion of the federal question to
a strict interpretation of the marital deduction-that is, what
25. Second Nat'l Bank v. United States, 222 F. Supp. 446 (D. Conn. 1963).
26. United States v. Second Nat'l Bank, 351 F.2d 489 (2d Cir. 1965).
27. Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 457 (1967). In this case the
Court limited its discussion to the effect of a state trial court proceeding. The
Court was careful to point out that since Blair involved the effect of proceed-
ings in a state appellate court, it was not in issue.
28. The Court rejected the Gallagher and Pierpont rationales, and accepted
the position taken in Faulkerson which it considered as approaching the doc-
trine of Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
29. IxT. Rav. CODE of 1954 § 2056.
30. Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 464 (1967). See also S. REP. No.
1013, 80th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1948). This report is considered to be in keep-
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effect would a state decision have upon a particular federal
statute. At the same time the Supreme Court applied the broad
principles of the diversity cases31 and arrived at the conclusion
"that when the application of a federal tax statute is involved,
the decision of a state t0 court as to an underlying issue of a
state law should a jortiori not be controlling. '32 Although the
federal taxation statutes do not involve diversity situations, the
majority concluded that the same principles could be applied.
The State's highest court is the best authority of its own law
. . . and . . . [i]f there be no decision by that court, then
federal authority must apply what it finds to be the state
law after giving 'proper regard' to the relevant rulings of
other courts of the state.
83
The majority asserted that the decision will avoid the con-
flict which has evolved from the "non-adversary-adversary"
approach; while at the same time, the rule will be fair to the
taxpayer and protect the federal revenue. This conclusion, how-
ever, is not in agreement with the intent of Congress. Congress
has suggested that proper regard be given a state trial proceed-
ing which is adversary. Congress apparently felt that a person
who is bound by a certain property right under state law should
not be taxed adversely by the federal government when the neces-
sary implication of the taxing statute was to allow state law
to be controlling as to an underlying issue. Since the federal
courts may now make an independent investigation as to the
state law, it is foreseeable that even if state trial court proceed-
ings were adversary and the parties were bound by the decision,
the federal authority would not be bound if it found the deci-
sion, "in its opinion," to be contrary to state law.
Mr. Justice Harlan and Mr. Justice Douglas wrote strongly
worded dissents in the Bosch case. Mr. Justice Harlan accepted
the view in Pierpont which the majority claims to have circum-
vented:
[I]n cases in which state-adjudicated property rights are
contended to have federal tax consequences, federal courts
31. E.g., King v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 333
U.S. 153 (1948); West v. A.T.&T., 311 U.S. 223 (1940); Erie RR. v.
Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
32. Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 465 (1967).
33. Id. at 465 (emphasis added). See also King v. Order of United Commer-
cial Travelers of America, 333 U.S. 153 (1948).
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must attribute conclusiveness to the judgment of a state
court, of whatever level in the .state procedural system, un-
less the litigation from which the judgment resulted does
not bear the indicia of a genuinely adversary proceeding.
8 4
He asserted that the majority opinion would require federal
intervention to an unnecessary degree, which would injure both
the relationship between federal and state law and the uniform-
ity of the administration of law within the state.
Mr. Justice Douglas, on the other hand, accepted the Freuler-
Blair approach as outlined in Gallagher. He declared that if the
parties are bound under state law, the federal authorities should
also be bound.35
The "adversary" approach of Mr. Justice Harlan appears to
be the most reasonable and would be the most equitable to the
taxpayer. Less doubt may result by knowing or being able to
anticipate the possible outcome of the federal proceeding. Mr.
Justice Douglas' approach appears to place the burden of prov-
ing collusion on the federal government, while the majority ap-
proach will place the burden of proving applicable state law
on the taxpayer. Whatever the result of Bosch, one thing is
certain-when a federal tax question turns on the character of
a property right created by state law, it will be necessary for
the taxpayer to be prepared to argue his property rights under
state law in the federal courts.
IV. THE Ar-mutATH oF BosoH
It did not take long for a broad application of Bosch to ap-
pear. In Underwood v. United States86 the testator stated in his
will that the executor was not to receive as commissions more
than 5% of the gross estate. The executor accepted the appoint-
ment but upon completion of his duties requested 8%. The state
court granted 8% and the Commissioner disallowed 3% of the
expense as a deduction of the estate contending that under Ten-
nessee law, if the testator states a specific amount in his will
which the executor may receive and the executor accepts his
appointment, the executor is entitled to no greater compensation.
34. Commissioner v. Bosch, 387 U.S. 456, 481 (1967) (dissenting opinion)
(emphasis added).
35. Id. at 466-67.
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After an independent examination of Tennessee law the district
court upheld the Commissioner even though they felt it was
harsh for the beneficiary of the estate-a minor-to be
required to pay 8% commission as fixed by the court and to
disallow 3% of that amount for federal estate tax purposes
because of the direction of her father in his will . . .7
In Lakewood Plantation, Inc. v. United States,38 a South Car-
olina district court case, a new dimension was added to Bosch.
The grantor and taxpayer corporation had a deed reformed
ab initio in order to reserve timber and mineral rights to the
grantor. The Commissioner took the position that the corpora-
tion was attempting to escape tax liability based on these rights.
Although the district court found collusion in the tax sense in
the state court, it asserted that the Supreme Court in Bosch has
disregarded the Pierpont reasoning for a much stronger view.
In setting the case over for the trial, the court found that the
question at hand was one of fact; and although Bosch allowed
federal courts to review state law, its reasoning would also ap-
ply to an erroneous decision based on incorrect facts, and the
federal court could make an independent investigation into these
facts. 9
The state courts are also realizing the effects of Bosch. In
Connectiu t Bank & Trst Co. v. Cohen,40 a Connecticut
court, in refusing to entertain a suit to determine whether a
power of appointment was general or special, stated that "[o]ne
gains the impression from Bosch that in the tax field state trial
court decisions do no more than titillate the federal funny
bone." 41 The court concluded by saying that even if it did make
determination, the decision would only serve to be an amicus
curiae brief for the taxpayer.
V. Cowcrusio
While Bosch is written in narrow terms, it does not appear
that the federal circuits will find themselves limited in apply-
37. Id. at 395.
38. 272 F. Supp. 290 (D.S.C. 1967).
39. Id. at 294.
40. 232 A.2d 337 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1967).
41. Id. at 339. Perhaps the court overlooked the source of the rule. State
courts have consistently decided these cases with one eye on the taxing statute
and the other closed to the evidence and applicable state law.
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ing it only to the marital deduction situations. Bosch can be
applied uniformly among all jurisdictions in any situation in
which a federal tax controversy hinges on the determination of
a state property right. As found in Lakewood, the federal courts,
in federal tax controversies, may also use this doctrine to set
aside an erroneous application of facts in a state trial court. The
Court in Bosch stated that Blair has not been overruled. From
a broad application of the Bosch case, however, the Supreme
Court would eventually find it necessary to overrule Blair. Dur-
ing the interim period there is little doubt that the federal
courts will find some way to distinguish Blair, or if possible




Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
INTERNATIONAL LAW-THE PUEBLO INCIDENT
-POSSIBLE LEGAL ASPECTS UNDER
INTERNATIONAL LAW
At 1:45 P. M., January 23, 1968, sailors of the North Korean
Navy boarded and seized the 1.S.S. PuebZo in waters off the
coast of North Korea. The United States demanded release of the
ship, claiming that the Pueblo had been seized in international
waters, and stated that at no time had it intruded into the terri-
torial waters of North Korea.
The Secretary of State of the United States called this action
a violation of international law and an act of war.' North
Korea answered declaring that the PuebZo was seized within
North Korean territorial waters while carrying out hostile
activities.
2
The President reacted by calling to active duty 14,300 members
of the Air Reserve National Guard and the United States Am-
bassador to the United Nations asked the Security Council to
take prompt action before the United States was forced to take
matters into its own hands.3 North Korea emphatically stated
that it would consider any United Nations resolution null and
void.4 It would appear from all indications, therefore, that
North Korea will never voluntarily submit the case to the In-
ternational Court of Justice or to any arbitration board.
Although North Korea is not a member of the United Nations
and not bound by her regulations and resolutions, however, as
a nation she is subject to the basic principles of international
law. The purpose of this article is to attempt to analyze the
significance of the seizure of the Pueblo under international law.
The "law of nations", as international law is sometimes called,
is primarily founded on custom and tradition. It is, therefore,
often difficult to formulate exactly what the law is in a given
area.
As one writer stated:
International law may be defined as that body of law which
is composed for its greater part of the principles and rules
of conduct which States feel themselves bound to observe,
1. TimE, Feb. 2, 1968, at 13.
2. N. Y. Times, Jam 24, 1968, at 1, col. 8.
3. TIME, Feb. 2, 1968, at 16.
4. N.Y. Times, Jan. 28, 1968, § 4, at E, col. 5.
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and therefore, do commonly observe in their relations with
each other. ...5
This law governing the use of the seas, therefore, has arisen out
of a balancing of the interests of all people who use these
waters.0 The existence of what is termed the "territorial sea"
is an example of how competing interests shaped the develop-
ment of the law of the seas. Whether the Pueblo was sailing
within the North Korean territorial waters can only be evaluated
against the general history relating to the concept of "territorial
sea."
Against the generally recognized need for freedom of naviga-
tion of the seas for all nations, there has been the equally im-
portant need for coastal states to be able to regulate the use of
waters adjacent to their coast. By the eighteenth century the
right of a coastal state to exercise its sovereignty over the terri-
torial sea had become firmly established. In 1-702 Bynkershock,
a Dutch jurist, stated what was then a well-known principle:
A "littoral state could dominate only such width of coastal
waters as lay within range of cannon shot from shore batteries."
7
Some writers are of the opinion that this distance was approxi-
mately three miles, while others feel that the three mile terri-
torial sea had an independent origin.8 Despite the widespread
observance of a three mile limit, it has never become firmly es-
tablished as a rule of international law.9
Among the chief opponents of the three mile rule has been the
Soviet Union and some South American countries, who adopted
the view that the breadth of the territorial sea should be left to
the discretion of the individual nation.' 0
Attempts were made to reach an agreement with respect to the
maximum breadth of the territorial sea at the Hague Codifica-
tion Conference in 1930, the first Geneva Conference on the Law
of the Sea in 1958, and the second Geneva Conference on the Law
of the Sea in 1960. All of the conferences concluded without
producing any agreement.
5. J. STARKE, AN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAw 1 (5th ed. 1953).
6. Id. at 19.
7. Id. at 180.
8. Id. at 181.
9. Id; M. McDoUGAL & W. BulnE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS
486-88 (1962).
10. M. McDoUGAL & W. BtuR=, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 486
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This disagreement among the nations influenced the United
States in 1960 to present a compromise proposal, calling for a
six-mile territorial sea with an additional six miles for fisheries.
Despite the fact that at the time the 1960 Conference convened
only twenty of the seventy-three nations present adhered to the
three-mile limit,1 the United States asserted that it was under
no duty to recognize any country's claim to a territorial sea of
over three miles.12 In contrast Russia, after the 1958 Geneva
Convention, stated that the "three-mile limit is not and never has
been a generally recognized rule in the law of the sea. The Con-
ference once and for all buried the three-mile limit legend.' 13
North Korea asserts that her sovereignty over her territorial
sea extends to a distance of twelve miles from the coast and that
the U.S.S. Pueblo was within this twelve mile boundary at the
time it was seized. The previous discussion indicated that the
law concerning the breadth of the territorial sea is extremely un-
settled. It would be difficult at this time, therefore, to conclude
that the North Korean claim to twelve miles is in violation of
international law. Assuming, for the purpose of discussion, that
the twelve mile claim is permissible under the law of nations, it
is next necessary to determine whether any rule of law permitted
the Pueblo to navigate within the territorial sea of North Korea.
Over its territorial waters along the marginal sea the control
of the territorial sovereign is limited. While it may regu-
late at will matters pertaining to fisheries, the enjoyment of
the underlying land, coastal trade, police and pilotage, the
use of particular channels, as well as maritime ceremonial,
it is not permitted to debar foreign merchant vessels from
the enjoyment of what is known as the right of 'innocent
passage', so long as the conduct of a vessel is not injurious
to the safety and welfare of the littoral state.14
This right of innocent passage, developed as a natural corollary
to the doctrine of freedom of the seas,15 in practice applies to
both merchant vessels and warships.' 6
11. 29 MuIL L. REv. 55 (1965).
12. Id. at 57.
13. Id., quoting Turkin, The Geneva Conference on the Law of the Sea,
NtL AFFA mS 47 (Moscow, 1958).
14. 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAw 343-44 (1965), quot-
ing, V. Wallace, mere, Oct. 31, 1956, Ms. Dept. of State, file 237.1541-Caribel
10-3156.
15. Id. at 347.
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There has, however, always been disagreement with respect to
whether warships enjoy the same freedom of navigation through
the territorial seas as do merchant vessels.17 The 1958 Conven-
tion on the Territorial Sea and Contiguous Zones adopted the
view that the right of innocent passage is enjoyed by all ships.' 8
In adopting this view the 1958 Convention rejected the proposed
requirement that warships must have prior authorization or
give notice of their intention to pass through the territorial
sea of a coastal state.19 Despite the results of the conference the
predominant attitude of many states could be that warships are
required to give notice before exercising the right to pass through
territorial waters.20 If the opinion of nations is that this prior
notice must be given by a warship, the United States could pos-
sibly be condemned (assuming again that the Pueblo was within
the territorial waters of North Korea). There is no evidence,
however, that North Korea has set forth this as a requirement
for warships that might enter her territorial waters.2 '
As the words "innocent passage" imply, the movement of a
vessel through the territorial sea must be in a manner which is
not prejudicial to the peace, good order, or security of the
littoral state.22 Article 14 of the Convention on the Territorial
Sea and the Contiguous Zone contains the following provisions
pertaining to the right of innocent passage:
2. Passage means navigation through the territorial sea for
the purpose of either traversing the sea without entering
internal waters, or of proceeding to internal waters, or
of making for the high seas from internal waters.
3. Passage includes stopping and anchoring, but only in so
far as the same are incidental to ordinary navigation or
are rendered necessary by force miajeure or by distress.
17. Id. at 217; 1 C. HYDE, INTERNATiONAL LAw 516 (2d rev. ed. 1945).
18. 4 M. WHITEMA, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 344 (1965).
19. M. McDOUGAL & W. Buaxa, THIE PUBLC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 219-
20 (1962).
20. Id. at 220. But see C. HYDE, I-TERNATioNAL LANw 517-18 (2d rev. ed.
1945).
21. Upto this point it has been assumed, for the sake of argument that the
U.S.S. Pueblo is a warship. With respect to the right of innocent passage
the law of nations seems to make a distinction only between the rights of war-
ships and merchant vessels and does not define any separate rights for state
ships other than men-of-war.
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4. Passage is innocent so long as it is not prejudicial to the
peace, good order or security of the coastal state. Such
passage shall take place in conformity with these articles
and with other rules of international law.
The problem here, of course, is to determine whether the in-
telligence gathering activities of the Pueblo were dangerous
enough to be labeled, "prejudicial to the peace, good order or
security" of North Korea. In the Corfu Channel Case, four
British warships were proceeding through the North Corfu
Channel with crews at "action station," with guns trained fore
and aft and not loaded, when two ships were struck by mines
moored in Albanian territorial waters. This passage was held
to be "innocent" by the International Court of Justice because
the ships had a political mission with an intention to intimidate
with a display of force.28 At least one writer was of the opinion
that if the purpose of the passage had been to observe the shore-
line and battery emplacements then it would not have qualified
as innocent.2 4 Due to the widespread use of electronic eaves-
dropping equipment among nations today, however, a claim that
the Pueblo was threatening the security of North Korea would
probably have little merit. Presently Russian trawlers similar to
the Pueblo are stationed off California, South Carolina, Flor-
ida's Cape Kennedy, Guam and Alaska.25 The use of these so-
called "spy ships" is simply another facet of the "cold war"
which has heretofore been accepted by the nations of the world.
If perhaps there had been an armada of United States ships
following the Pueblo or a sudden concentration of troops on the
North Korea border, there would have been more cause for fear.
Without some action of this nature, however, it would be diffi-
cult for North Korea to prove that her security was being
threatened.
Even assuming that North Korea could show a legitimate
reason for concern, however, the actual seizing of the Pueblo
seems to violate all rules of international law. The 1958 Con-
vention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone codified
the apparent customary international law concerning the coastal
state's jurisdiction over warships within its territorial waters.
Article 23 of the Convention provides:
23. 4 M. WHITEMAN, DIGEST OF INTNATIONAL LAW 355-56 (1965).
24. Id. at 357.
25. TIME, Feb. 2, 1968, at 15.
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If any warship does not comply with the regulations of the
coastal state concerning passage through the territorial sea
and disregards any request for compliance which is made
to it, the coastal state may require the warship to leave the
territorial sea.
20
It would seem therefore that warships are not subject legally
to the jurisdiction that North Korea has exercised over the
Pueblo. On the other hand, the law is not explicit with respect
to the jurisdiction over government vessels other than warships.
In a detailed analysis of the problem in The Public Order of the
Oceans, however, a similar immunity is shown to be enjoyed by
government vessels engaged in noncommercial operations. 27
For the purpose of this discussion it has been assumed that the
U.S.S. Pueblo was seized within the territorial waters of North
Korea. If, as the United States claims, the Pueblo was seized
in international waters the doctrine of "hot pursuit" becomes an
important consideration. Under this doctrine a vessel which
violates the law of a littoral state while in its territory may be
pursued onto the high seas and arrested. The most recent and
most comprehensive codification of "hot pursuit" is the product
of the 1958 Geneva Convention on the High Seas. Article 23
provides:
1. The hot pursuit of a foreign ship may be undertaken
when the competent authorities of the coastal state have
good reason to believe that the ship has violated the laws
and regulations of that state. Such pursuit may be com-
menced when the foreign ship or one of its boats is within
the internal waters or the territorial sea or the contigu-
ous zone of the pursuing state, and may be continued out-
side the territorial sea or contiguous zone if the pursuit
has not been interrupted. .... 28
Although there is no specific provision in Article 23 exempting
warships or other governmental vessels from this right of a
coastal state, Articles 8 and 9 grant complete immunity from
any jurisdiction by the coastal state to warships and government
vessels used in non-commercial service while on the high seas.
26. M. McDOUGAL & W. BURmE, THE PUBLIC ORDER OF THE OCEANS 283
(1962).
27. Id. 284-89.
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It would seem that these Articles would apply even when the
right of hot pursuit was being exercised.
29
The previous analysis has resulted in the following conclu-
sions: First, North Korea's claim to a twelve mile territorial
sea may be valid under existing international law. Second, the
U.S.S. Pueblo was probably competent to exercise the right of
innocent passage through the territorial waters of North Korea.
Third, it would be extremely difficult for North Korea to set
forth a convincing argument to the effect that such passage was
not innocent. Fourth, even if this could be done the seizure of
the Pueblo would more than likely be considered illegal. Finally,
the doctrine of hot pursuit exists although it is doubtful if North
Korea was competent to exercise jurisdiction over a ship such as
the Pueblo while on the high seas.
It appears, therefore, that the seizure of the Pueblo would be
considered illegal under international law if the question were
ever submitted to the International Court of Justice or a board
of arbitration. 0
BROOKs P. GOLDSMITa, JR.
29. Id. at 634, 636.
30. In 1804 the United States found itself in a similar predicament when the
U.S.S. Philadelphia was seized and her crew clapped in irons by Barbary
pirates after she had run aground in Tripoli harbor. Lieutenant Stephen
Decatur with 84 men slipped into the harbor, routed the 200 men guarding the
Philadelphia, set fire to her and sailed away in the famous Intrepid. TIME,
Feb. 2, 1968, at 14.
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STATUTORY FEDERAL INTERPLEADER-FED-
ERAL INTERPLEADER MAY BE INVOKED
EVEN THOUGH DIVERSITY AMONG THE
CLAIMANTS IS MINIMAL AND NONE OF
THE CLAIMS HAVE BEEN REDUCED TO
JUDGMENT*
At law the only course open to the disinterested stakeholder
(the holder of a "thing, debt or duty" who has no interest in that
which he holds) confronted by several adverse claims to the stake,
was to defend against each claim as suit was brought by the
several claimants. Equity recognized the unfair burden which
maintaining defenses to several actions related to a subject in
which he had no interest imposed upon the stakeholder. The
bill of interpleader was equity's remedy. After the bill of com-
plaint had been filed and the stake paid into the equity court,
that court would interplead the several claimants so that they
might litigate their claims among themselves without involving
the stakeholder in the controversy. The stakeholder's remedy
was protection or indemnification against subsequent actions
brought with respect to the stake.'
Federal courts had jurisdiction to entertain bills of interplead-
er before Congress spoke on the subject,2 but their jurisdiction
was inadequate in many cases because of limitations on federal
jurisdiction. District courts could issue process only within their
respective districts," and they could not ordinarily stay proceed-
ings in state courts without specific congressional authority.4
If a claimant were in another district or brought action in a state
court, the federal courts were rendered ineffective forums for
an interpleader action because the court was powerless to inter-
plead some of the claimants.
State courts were also unable to provide effective relief in
many instances. If one of the claimants happened to be a citizen
* State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
1. 4 J. PomEzoy, A TEATsE oN EQUITY Jurs IuDENcE § 1320 (5th ed.
1941).
2. Klaber v. Maryland Cas. Co., 69 F.2d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 1934); citing
Chafee, Intcrpleader in the United States Courts, 41 YALE L.J. 1134 (1932).
3. E.g., Robertson v. Railroad Labor Bd., 268 U.S. 619 (1925).
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of another state, because of the state court's limited jurisdiction
its interpleader remedy was only partially effective.5
There was, therefore, often no satisfactory forum for an inter-
pleader action. This situation became of increasing interest to
insurance companies with the advent of automobile liability
insurance and increased interstate commerce. When it had issued
a limited liability policy under which there arose a number of
claimants whose claims were mutually exclusive, the insurance
company was put in the position of being a disinterested stake-
holder. The question was not whether it would have to pay to
the full extent of its liability, but to whom it would pay. Be-
cause of the jurisdictional limitation of state and federal inter-
pleader, "the company was often sued upon the same policy
in two or more states or districts, and thus subjected to vexa-
tious . . . litigation. . .. "0
Congress provided a partial remedy in the initial federal inter-
pleader act, the Federal Interpleader Act of 1917.7 That act
extended the jurisdiction of district courts to permit their in-
terpleading of claimants within and without their districts. A
subsequent act, the Federal Interpleader Act of 1926,8 inter alia,
gave the district courts authority to stay suits in state courts
when interpleader had been invoked. The two primary impe-
diments to functional federal interpleader proceedings had thus
been removed.
In State Farm Fire c Casualty Co. v. Tashire9 the insurance
company, State Farm, had insured the driver of a pickup truck
who collided with a Greyhound bus injuring more than thirty
persons. Among the claimants were citizens of five states. No
claims had been reduced to judgment, but the insurance com-
pany had been named as a defendant in four suits filed in Cali-
fornia state courts seeking damages in excess of $1,000,000. State
Farm's bodily injury liability was limited to $20,000 per acci-
dent. It also had the duty of legal representation of the driver
in actions covered by the policy. State Farm brought action in
the nature of interpleader' o in the United States District Court
5. Klaber v. Maryland Cas. Co., 69 F2d 934, 937 (8th Cir. 1934).
6. Id.
7. Ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929 (1917).
8. Ch. 273, 44 Stat. 416 (1926).
9. 386 U.S. 523 (1967).
10. See discussion infra n. 44.
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for the District of Oregon asking that all claimants be required
to establish their claims against the pickup driver and his in-
surer in that single proceeding and that State Farm be dis-
charged from all further obligations under the policy. The dis-
trict court issued a temporary injunction along the lines re-
quested by State Farm. The injunction was later broadened to
enjoin suits against the other potentially liable defendants, Grey-
hound Lines, Inc. and the owner of the pickup truck (who was
not the driver).
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed, 1 on
interlocutory appeal'12 holding that in states which did not per-
mit "direct action" suits against the insurance company, the
company could not invoke federal interpleader until the claims
against the insured had been reduced to judgment.
The Supreme Court's disposition of Tashire resolved signifi-
cant questions related to the proper function of statutory federal
interpleader and of federal jurisdiction under the current inter-
pleader act, title 28 United States Code section 1335.
I. FEDERAL JURIsDICTION UNDER THE INTRPLEADER ACT
The current federal interpleader act provides in part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any
civil action of interpleader or in the nature of interpleader
* . . if (1) Two or more adverse claimants, of diverse citi-
senship as defined in section 133 of this title, are claiming
or may claim .... 13
A. Diverse Citizenship as Defined in Section 1332.
The predecessors to section 1335 required that there be claim-
ants from different states as a basis for federal interpleader
jurisdiction 4 but this was construed not to be a requirement for
"complete diversity."' However, the most recent revision of the
11. Tashire v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 363 F.2d 7 (9th Cir. 1966).
12. 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a) (1) (1965).
13. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1965) (emphasis added).
14. Federal Interpleader Act of 1936, ch. 13, 49 Stat. 1096:
Federal Interpleader Act of 1926, ch. 273, 44 Stat. 416;
Federal Interpleader Act of 1925, ch. 317, 43 Stat. 976;
Federal Interpleader Act of 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929.
15. E.g., Railway Express Agency v. Jones, 106 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1939);
Cramer v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 91 F.2d 141 (8th Cir. 1937). "Complete
diversity" is "where any claimant whose interests are adverse to another also
has diverse citizenship from him .... [T]here are no disputes among co-
citizens and any phase of the controversy could independently have been stated





Published by Scholar Commons, 2020
COMMNTS
interpleader statute, title 28 United States Code section 1335
adopts diversity as defined in section 1332 of that title as the
basis for interpleader jurisdiction. Section 1332 defines the
diversity required in general as a basis for federal jurisdiction in
a civil action.
Incorporating the section 1332 diversity definition into the in-
terpleader statute posed a potential constitutional problem.
Section 1332 is the direct descendant of that portion of the Judi-
ciary Act of 1789 which provided for federal jurisdiction on
the basis of diversity.16 Chief Justice Marshall, speaking for
the Court in Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 17 construed that original
diversity requirement as a requirement for complete diversity.
Because the statutory language construed in Strawbridge was
similar to that of Article III of the Constitution, which sanctions
federal jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship, the ques-
tion arose whether it should be induced from the Strawbridge
decision that the Constitution also requires complete diversity.'8
Although the Court was not subsequently inclined to give
Strawbridge this expansive reading,19 the suspicion that it had
constitutional overtones lingered.20  Engrafting section 1332
diversity on to federal interpleader provided a nexus between
Tashire and Strawbridge with its possible implication.
On its own motion the Court in Tashire raised the question
whether the Constitution required complete diversity. Because
of the Congressional intent to remedy the problems posed by
mutiple claimants to a single fund and the tacit Congressional
acceptance of the judicial interpretation that previous inter-
pleader acts did not require complete diversity, the Court con-
cluded that Congress intended to require only minimal diversity
as a basis for invoking federal interpleader. The question was
whether such an intent violated Artcile III of the Constitution.
The Court found that it did not and that in fact the require-
ments of Article III were satisfied by "minimal diversity."'1
The Court in concluding that there was no constitutional re-
quirement relied on its previous decisions and those of inferior
16. See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939).
17. 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (1806).
18. See Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 71 (1939).
19. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 n. 6 (1967).
20. E.g., Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 308 U.S. 66, 71 (1939).
21. "Article III poses no obstacle to the legislative extension of federal
jurisdiction founded on diversity, so long as any two adverse parties are not
co-citizens." State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 531 (1967).
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courts indicating that Article III imposed no requirement for
complete diversity.22
Since, as the Court indicated, less than complete diversity had
been acceptable in other contexts pursuant to other legislation
2 3
and neither the parties nor the lower courts had raised the issues,
why did the Court feel compelled to consider the question of
"complete diversity"? The answer may lie in the nature of the
relationship between Tashire and Strawbridge or more specifi-
cally in the relationship between the two congressional require-
ments for diversity. Section 1332 is for practical purposes the
same as that portion of the Judiciary Act construed in Straw-
bridge. The Strawbridge case indicates that Congress intended
a requirement of "complete diversity." By adopting section
1332 diversity as a definition for the diversity required, the in-
terpleader statute Congress used the same language in a situation
in which it was clear that it did not intend to require complete
diversity. The essential difference between diversity as con-
strued in Strawbridge and Tashire was Congressional intent.
The language construed in both cases is similar to that of Article
III of the Constitution. Tashire, therefore, presented a situation
in which the Court could clearly demonstrate that Strawbridge
was based on the construction of a Congressional act and not
upon any Article III limitation. Though we can only speculate
as to the Court's motives, the clarity of the result is inescapable:
No implication of a constitutional requirement for complete
diversity should be drawn from Strawbridge, and there is in
fact no such requirement.
B. Are Claiming or May Claim
The Court of Appeals had held that interpleader was not
available in the circumstances presented by the Tashire case.
24
That decision rested on the facts that none of the claimants had
reduced their claims to judgment and that neither the applicable
state laws nor the terms of the policy provided for direct action
against the insurance company. The court concluded that there
were no "claimants" within the requirements of section 1335 and,
therefore, that there was no basis for federal jurisdiction.25
22. Id. at 531, n. 7.
23. Id.
24. Tashire v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 363 F2d 7 (9th Cir. 1966).
25. Justice Douglas concurred in this view and dissented from the majority
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The 1917 interpleader statute provided for jurisdiction when
adverse claimants "are claiming or may claim" the stake,
but the 1926 statute required claimants who "are claiming. '20
In FKaber v. Maryland Casualty 0o.27 the Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit found that by the omission of the "may
claim" language in the 1926 act, Congress intended to require
reduction of claims to judgment by at least two claimants prior
to the invocation of interpleader by the insurance company. The
court quoted Professor Chafee:
This change was made in order to secure the passage of the
Act of 1926. Some of the members of the Senate subcom-
mittee were not willing to permit the companies to obtain
the jurisdiction of the District Court when there was only
a possibility of claims by two or more persons.
28
Commenting later on this facet of the Klaber decision Profes-
sor Chafee wrote:
[I]t is respectfully submitted that Judge Sanborn imposed
a needlessly drastic test, and that a bill in the nature of in-
terpleader should lie even before any judgment. It is suffi-
cient for the court to assure itself that the danger of
mutiplicity of suits is genuinely present. The seriousness
of the accident and the obvious good faith of the victims in
seeking damages meet this requirement.
The occurrence of a disaster giving rise to numerous bona
fide claims that in the aggregate far exceed the limited lia-
bility should be sufficient showing of multiplicity of suits
to support the bill.
2 9
The objection to the requirement that at least two claims be
reduced to judgment before interpleader could be invoked was
the fact that it precipitated a race to judgment in which the first
claimant to acquire judgment might disproportionately deplete
the fund before the other claimants acted 0 This consideration
26. Compare the Federal Interpleader Act of 1917, ch. 113, 39 Stat. 929
(1917) zith the Federal Interpleader Act of 1926, ch. 273, 44 Stat. 416 (1926).
27. 69 F.2d 934 (8th Cir. 1934).
28. Id. at 939. Chafee, Interpleader in the United States Courts, 41 YALE L.J.
1134, 1163 n. 98 (1932).
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apparently prompted Professor Chafee to attack the 7aber de-
cision though it flew in the fact of his own recognition of Con-
gressional intent.81 Tashire decided this question.
In the 1948 revision of the Judiciary Act the "may claim"
language was restored to the interpleader statute.8 2 In Pan
American Fire & Casualty Co. v. Revere83 a Louisiana district
court construed the inclusion of the "may claim" language as
dispensing with the requirement that two claims must have been
reduced to judgment by adverse claimants to facilitate invoca-
tion of federal interpleader. Some doubt was raised as to the
effect of that decision in National Casualty Co. v. Insurance Co.
of North Amne ra. 34 In that case an Ohio district court indicated
that unliquidated claims would be too remote to justify an in-
terpleader action unless by state law the insurance company was
considered a joint tortfeasor and could be sued directly by the
injured party. The NationaZ Casualty court distinguishec
Revere by pointing out that the court in that case had relied ii,
part on the Louisiana direct action statute.
There was therefore some question as to the import of the
1948 restoration of the "may claim" language.8 5 This question
was heightened by the fact that the Revisor's Note to the Re-
vision made no mention of the restoration of the "may claim"
language indicating that Congress may have intended no sub-
stantive change by the addition.36
The Supreme Court in Tashire adopted the opinion that the
omission of any reference in the Revisor's Note to the Revision
was inadvertent.87 The Court indicated that the weight of judi-
cial authority favored adoption of the Revere construction as
opposed to the narrower construction favored in National Cas-
ualty and concluded that the language of the statute and the
policy consideration of avoiding the race to judgment required
the more liberal interpretation. It held that two claims should
have been reduced to judgment before the insurance company
31. Id.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1335 (1965).
33. 188 F. Supp. 474 (E.D. La. 1960).
34. 230 F. Supp. 617 (N.D. Ohio 1964).
35. 3-A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTrm, § 22.08[2] (2d ed. 1967).
36. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 540-41 (1967)
(Douglas, J., dissenting).
37. Id. at 532 n. 11.
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could have invoked interpleader. The restoration of the "may
claim" language was interpreted as having overruled "the need-
lessly drastic test"3 9 established by Klaber.
II. Tnm PRoPER ScoPE op FEDERAL STATUTORy INTERPLEADER
Having decided that Tashire presented a proper situation for
the invocation of interpleader, the Court considered the proper
scope of the second stage of interpleader which involved the
actual litigation of the claims among the claimants.
The district court had issued an injunction providing that all
suits against State Farm, the pickup driver, the pickup owner
and Greyhound be prosecuted in the interpleader proceeding.40
Pursuant to that injunction all of the suits which arose out of the
collision would have been settled in one interpleader proceeding.
The bill of interpleader was originally intended to serve one
purpose, to relieve the disinterested stakeholder of the vexation
of multiple litigation with respect to the stake.41 To prevent
spurious use of the bill for other purposes equity prescribed sev-
eral strict rules limiting the invocation of interpleader. One of
these requirements was that the claimants be in fact claiming the
same thing or that their claims be mutually exclusive.42 Profes-
sor Chafee gives the following explanation of that requirement:
If A offers a commission to any broker -who effects a sale
of certain land and two brokers claim the commission, only
one can be entitled because there can be but one sale. The
claims overlap and cannot both be right. The requisite for
interpleader exists. Suppose, however, A makes a contract
with a broker C1 to pay him a commission if he finds a
purchaser ready, able, and willing to pay $200 an acre for
the land, and makes a similar contract with C2. If both
brokers produce purchasers as described and sue for their
commissions, there is no mutual exclusiveness. A's obliga-
tion to one broker is in no way conditional on the previous
non production of a purchaser by some other broker. A may
very likely be liable to both. The two suits are based on two
39. Chafee, supra n. 29.
40. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 528 (1967).
41. 3-A J. MooRE, FEDERA. PRActiCE § 22.02[1] (2d ed. 1967); 4 J.
POMEROY, A TREATISE oN EQUiTY JURISPRUDENCE § 1320 (5th ed. 1941).
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obligations, not one. He cannot compel the brokers to in-
terplead, for there is no controversy between them. In other
words, when the two claims may both be right, and the
validity of one does not depend upon the invalidity of the
other, there is no reason why law or equity should unite
them in one proceeding.
4
Clearly the claimants which State Farm sought to interplead
in Tashire were independent claimants. Their claims against the
insured were not mutually exclusive. The insured could quite
possibly have been liable to all of the claimants. Therefore it
appears that a strict bill of interpleader would have been pre-
cluded by the requirement that the claims be mutually exclusive.
What State Farm requested, however, was a bill in the nature
of interpleader. The 1936 Interpleader Act 44 gave federal
courts jurisdiction over bills in the nature of interpleader. Prior
to that time federal statutory interpleader had been subject to
the same limitations as the strict equity interpleader, including
the requirement that claims be mutually exclusive. 45 Permitting
bills in the nature of interpleader was salutory, facilitating a
relaxation of the rules limiting the invocation of interpleader
and enabling the courts to premise the action on equities other
than vexation of the stakeholder incident to multiple litigation.4
The original safeguards against misuse of interpleader, which
proscribed its expansion as well, had been relaxed by Congress.
The manifest question was how far interpleader might be ex-
panded to encompass new situations and accomplish new pur-
poses.
A situation in which expansion seemed desirable was pre-
sented in the Tashire or "pie slicing" situation.47 There were a
number of claimants against the insured party whose claims in
the aggregate far exceeded the total funds available under the
policy. If the insured tortfeasor were of modest means, the pro-
ceeds from the policy would be the only fund available for satis-
fying the judgments recovered. In such a situation it would seem
appropriate that a bill in the nature of interpleader be invoked
43. Chafee, Modernizing Interpleader, 30 YALE LJ. 814, 819 (1921).
44. Ch. 13, 49 Stat 1096.
45. Klaber v. Maryland, 69 F2d 934, 939 (8th Cir. 1934).
46. 3-A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTICE § 22.02[2] (2d ed. 1967); Chafee,
Federal Interpleader Siiwe the Act of 1936, 49 YALE L.J. 377, 412-21 (1940).
47. 3-A J. MooRE, FEDERAL PRACTiCE § 22.02[2] (2d ed. 1967); Chafee,
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to protect the fund. Permitting an interpleader action would
prevent the race to judgment and dispersal of funds on an in-
equitable first come, first served basis. 48 The court could re-
quire all of the claims against the fund to be brought in a single
action, though the judgments against the insured on which the
claims were based would be recovered in separate actions. The
Supreme Court found that a bill in the nature of interpleader
would properly lie in such a situation but for the limited purpose
of protecting the funds for the benefit of the claimants. 49
Insurance companies are interested in interpleading not only
all claims against themselves, i.e., the fund, but all claims against
their insured as well because of recent decisions indicating that
a company which contracts to pay up to the limits of the policy
and defend any suits arising thereunder, contracts for two dis-
tinct coverages. 0 It contracts to pay judgments against the in-
sured up to the policy limits, and it independently contracts to
defend in all of the suits against the insured arising from the
accident.81 In a case such as Tashire in which there was likely
to be a great deal of litigation, the expense of defending against
all of the suits would be considerable. This expense would be
greatly reduced if the insurance company could interplead all
of the claimants against its insured and settle all of the suits in
one proceeding. Interpleader provided a means of avoiding the
expense of defending a large number of separate actions if the
court would allow it to be used for that purpose.
There was some statutory support for State Farm's contention
that all of the suits related to the policy fund should be en-
joined to secure their prosecution in the interpleader proceeding.
section 2361 of title 28 provides in part:
In any civil action of interpleader or in the nature of inter-
pleader under section 1335 of this title, a district court may
issue its process for all claimants and enter its order re-
48. State Farm Fire & Gas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 533 (1967). A
race to judgment might also pose a problem for the insurer. Keeton, Prefer-
ential Settlement of Liability Insurance Claims, 70 HARv. L. Rnv. 27, 37 n.
10 (1956).
49. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 533-34 (1967).
50. E.g., American Cas. Co. v. Hovard, 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951);
Travelers Indem. Co. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 260 F. Supp. 530 (W.D.
La. 1966).
51. E.g., American Cas. Co. v. Howard, 187 F.2d 322 (4th Cir. 1951);
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straining them from instituting or prosecuting in any pro-
ceeding in any State or United States court affecting the
property, instrument or obligation involved in the inter-
pleader action ... 52
When the claims are mutually exclusive, this section would
clearly be applicable, but Tashire did not present such a situa-
tion. The Court concluded that the proponents of interpleader
did not have the Tashire situation in mind and that, therefore, it
did not come within section 2361. 58 The effect of the decision
was to limit section 2361 to situations in which the claims are
mutually exclusive, the situation which Congress had contem-
plated when enacting section 2361.
Having concluded that section 2361 did not require the enjoin-
ing of suits against the insured as well as suits against the in-
surance company, the Court looked to the effect of granting
such an injunction. There were thirty-five claimants who wished
to press claims against the truck driver, the truck owner and
Greyhound as well as against State Farm, the truck driver's in-
surer. If an injunction along the lines requested by State Farm,
as expanded to include Greyhound and the truck owner, and
granted by the district court, were appropriate, all of these suits
would have to be brought in a single forum and proceeding. The
claimants would be stripped of their right to proceed independ-
ently upon their claims in their choice of the available forums.54
The motivating force behind this sweeping injunction would be
State Farm's $20,000 liability which would dictate the forum
and proceeding for actions by numerous plaintiffs against sev-
eral defendants involving claims far in excess of $20,000. The
Court could find no support for such an injunction in the statu-
tory interpleader scheme.55 Interpleader was not intended to
resolve all of the problems incident to multiparty litigation inci-
dent to a mass tort. It was not intended as an all purpose "bill
of peace."156
State Farm's legitimate ground for seeking interpleader was
to protect the $20,000 fund for the benefit of those who secured
52. 28 U.S.C. § 2361 (1965) (emphasis added).
53. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 534 (1967).
54. Id. at 536.
55. Id.
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judgment against its insured.5 7 This purpose could be accom-
plished by requiring that all suits by claimants against State
Farm be prosecuted in a single proceeding.5 It was not neces-
sary, desirable or permissible to require that claims against the
alleged tortfeasor also be prosecuted in that proceeding. The
Court would not let an interpleader action, invoked for a valid
equitable purpose, be expanded in the second stage to permit the
insurance company to mitigate its contractual obligation to de-
fend the insured at the expense of denying the claimant's sub-
stantial rights.
III. CocrcsioN
The Court in dealing with the first stage of interpleader,
which determines whether interpleader may be invoked, con-
tinued the practice of considering federal interpleader legisla-
tion as remedial and construing it liberally to accomplish its
intended purpose. The Court held that jurisdiction under the
interpleader act could be based on minimal diversity and that
it was not necessary that there be technical claims, i.e., claims
which had been reduced to judgment, against the fund. The
effect is to make interpleader more readily available in a greater
number of situations.
The Tashire decision indicates with respect to the second stage
of interpleader, which involves the actual litigation of the claims,
that permitting the bill in the nature of interpleader does not
divest interpleader of many of the characteristics of its equitable
forerunner. The bill in the nature of interpleader, however,
facilitates invocation of interpleader for equitable purposes
other than protecting the stakeholder against the vexation of
multiple claims and pursuant to that end, relaxes the traditional
rules limiting interpleader to that purpose. Two inferences
might be drawn from Tashire: Interpleader is inextricably as-
sociated with the idea of controlling the equities evolving around
a particular fund held by the party seeking relief, or more gen-
erally that the interpleader proceeding is limited by general
equitable theoretical consideration. Either premise would justify
the Tashire decision, as the result would have been inequitable
57. Id. at 535; See also Travelers Indem. Co. v. Greyhound Lines, Inc.,
260 F. Supp. 530, 535 (W.D. La. 1966).
58. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v. Tashire, 386 U.S. 523, 535 (1967); see
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without reversal and the scope of the procedure would have ex-
ceeded that necessary for equitable disposition of the fund.
The narrower inference that interpleader should be confined
to the equitable disposition of particular things, debts or duties
seems more cogent. Interpleader should not be available for
purposes other than those linked to a disposition of a particular
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